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1. General Purport of Thesis:
It is only within recent years that the
subject of Psychology has been freed from the age¬
long domination of metaphysics and placed on a
separate footing as an Experimental Science.
It was but natural that in the infancy of Phil¬
osophy it should seel: to emorace under its meta¬
physical side the phenomena of mind which are the
concomitants of our physical being. And, as was
also to be expected, Materialism was the basis on
which Philosophy sought to explain these Phenom¬
ena.
Beginning with Plato we get that Dualism which
has exerted so great an influence that it is today
a powerful force. This, to be brief, asserts that
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the soul with its consciousness is imprisoned in
the material body - that they are both separate
entities, being merely loosely connected through
the medium of the brain. Aristotle tried to
reconcile the apparent discordance of this theory
with his observations by pointing out that the
mind is the creator and originator of all organic
matter, and until we come to Descartes,on the whole
the views of Aristotle dominated.
The Cartesian Philosophy took within its scope
Animal Psychology which was now beginning to occu¬
py some little attention, and in his pronouncement
that animals are purely automatic creatures from
a psychological point of view Descartes may be
said to have stimulated the enquiry into Zoologi¬
cal Psychology which has occupied unceasing atten¬
tion up to the present time.
"Ian is the only being who thinks - who indeed
has consciousness - satisfied this Cartesian
School, Animals were automatic only. And up to
a comparatively recent date this opinion was gen¬
erally held. That not only was the difference
of the mentality of man from that of brutes one
of degree, but so differing in kind as to admit
of no comparative analogy whatever.
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Darwin's great Hypothesis had not yet revo¬
lutionised the prevailing system of Zoological
doctrine, and the possibility of man's descent,
even from a morphological point of view, in Evo¬
lutional Continuity from beings of a lower order
had not disturbed the complacent serenity of the
special Creation believers.
When this did come so great was the change
of view imposed upon Biologists, so largely did the
structural and physiological loom on their mental
horizon that for a time the psychological equiva¬
lent was lost sight of or regarded as a mere side
issue. Evolution by Natural Selection became an
accepted fact.
. But the realm of Biology embraces the animal
life in all its aspects - morphological and psycho¬
logical, and for a time there was danger that the
part played by the mental factor in the biological
end of racial preservation might be lost sight of.
But though he did not follow if to its logical
conclusion Darwin really iaid the foundation, offthat
Psychological side of Evolution.
The fetters of Metaphysics were still close
upon the mind of man however, and many thinkers of
note, while in complete agreement with the theory
of man's morphological evolution from being's of a
lower order, held strongly that the mentality of
man was a thing apart, having no Ancestral line
in Evolution direct or indirect.
In the establishment of a scientific Psychol¬
ogy the reparation of the problem of Metaphysics
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Is absolutely necessary, and if we are to regard
the phenomena of mind as coming within the pale of
scientific enquiry at all we must vigorously disown
the Metaphysical and deal only with facts observed
and logically enforced. Huxley, in his zealous
support of Evolution from a Materialistic point of
view, -would not admit that consciousness - or more
generally the mental factor was of any biological
value, and from his demonstration of the purposive
and to him equally purposeful actions of the brain¬
less frog concluded that animal consciousness was
no other than a mere accompaniment of molecular
changes in the brain.
"The consciousness of brutes" he said,
would appear to be related to the mechanism
of their bodies, simply as a collateral
product of their working', and to be as com¬
pletely without power of modifying that
Working' as the steam whistle which accom¬
panies the work- of a locomotive engine is
without influence on its machinery." (a)
But as Lloyd Ksfplh points out Huxley was
carried too far in this matter. For, whereas the
(a) Huxley. Collected Essays Vol. I. p?,40. 4
the frog from which the physical centres of con¬
sciousness have teen removed sits crouched and
motionless and vrill sooner starve than feed it¬
self - although food put into its mouth is swal¬
lowed - the unmutilated frog behaves in a very
different manner.
If the consciousness', admitted to be present,
has no effect upon behaviour', "how" asks Lloyd Mor¬
gan, "can an Evolutionist who accepts this conclu¬
sion account on Evolutionary grounds for the esist-
ence of a useless adjunct to neural processes?"(a)
This extreme view Huxley would carry into hu¬
man mentality as well, but this does not immediate¬
ly concern us here.
The crucial point of this discussion on the Bvo
Evolutional Continuity of the mind of man and brute
is the important part played by consciousness,
whether we are dealing with the dimmest sentience -
which we assume to be present in some of the most
lowly invertebrates - or of the highest product of
human Intellection.
Putting aside Huxley's view, I hope to show
that consciousness has a role to play in Evolution,
and that, a very important one, and shall endeavour
as far as my knowledge of recent researches goes to
trace
(a) Lloyd morgan, "Animal Behaviour" p 308.
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its continuity from the more lowly forms of animal
life to its beginnings, at. least, in man.
It is a matter beset 'with many difficulties
and the different conclusions arrived at by experi¬
enced investigators do not render a study of the
subject any easier. It is a practically hopeless
study for any but a mind trained to the laws of
general Psychology. A sound if narrow basis hav¬
ing been obtained,however, from ihtfb§pi§tive study,
the comparison and correlation of results thus ob¬
tained broaden the conclusions of the psychologist
and prepare him for the more difficult study of a
comparative method of Zoological Psychology.
Every infef'§n@§ we draw as to the psychical
processes of our fellow being has to be by analogy,
for any more direct acquaintance with psychical
processes other than our own is inexorably denied
us.
To a still greater extent must we stretch the
argument by Analogy in an investigation in the
field of Zoological Psychology. We have, An fact,
to interpret the objective phenomena of animal psy¬
chology - and these are all that are open to us -
in the very terms which we use for the explanation
of conceptual thoughts. This is an insuperable
obstacle and it is magnified ten-fold by the fact
that many observers would se.h to derdve the re-
suits of experiments in Zoological Psychology from
the more complicated of our intellectual functions
instead of,:when possible, explaining them in teri^s
of a lower mental grade. Lloyd-"'organ's dictum in
this question is worth remarking, he says:-
"In no case may we interpret an action
as the outcome of the exercise of a higher
psychical■faculty if it can be interpreted
as the outcome of the exercise of one which
stands lower in the psychological scale."
(a)
This is a very different thing from Wundt's
erroneous statement that we should always have re¬
course to the simplest explanation, which he remarks
is the approved raaxim of the exact sciences. But
is this so? "Is the simplest explanation of phen¬
omena accepted by scientists? As a matter of fact
in this case the simplest explanation of the psy¬
chical activities of animals would be to credit
them with Reflection and Conceptual Thought. It
is a much more simple thing to assume that man-^s
mentality is a thing sui generis and by isolated
creation - sprung as Athene from the head of Zeus -
*
than it is to arrive logically at the conclusion
that it has reached its present stage along the
slow and tortuous pathway of Evolution.
Lloyd "organ's definition so ms a fair one and
its advantages in pruning the exuberant imagination
in our dealings with the mentality of animals more
(?«) Lloyd "organ. Introduction to Comparative
Psychology, p 53.
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than counterbalances its apparent injustice to the
possible explanation of their objective mental phen¬
omena.
For if comparative psychology has suffered much
in the noxious jungle of Metaphysics it has suffered
much more at the hands of some of its investigators,
.'he study of the subject moreover has been rendered
more difficult by the existing confusion of termin¬
ology. Each observer has a different interpreta¬
tion to offer of the same mental process, thus, He-
flex Action; instinct; Intelligence; Inference and
Heason have definitions varying with the investi¬
gator, and so, on many points", come into grievous
collision. This is unfortunate but it would seem
to be inevitable, simply because the observers lire
different observers, and also because in Nature there
can be no doubt that, in the mental life of man and
of the higher animals many of these factors - notably
Instinct and Intelligence cross and re-cross in th'e
most perplexing manner. As I shall point out latex
no hard and fast line can be drawn as to where the
one begins and the other ends. The basal factor of
the mental life of a man may be pure instinct for
a -whole day or it may be marked by intellectual pro¬
cesses of the highest order. The explanation and
definition of the mental factors mentioned above
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which I propose to adopt I shall refer to in the
next paragraph.
Biology has accepted Evolution on the lines of
Uatural Selection as its guide and Comparative Psy¬
chology, which is a part of Biology, in its widest
interpretation, it seems to me is bound to do so a
also. And I shall hope to point out some of the
land-marks of the path along which Psychological
Evolution has advanced parallel with Biological
Evolution, noting also the aijparent continuity of
the process in all its essentials from brute to
man, up to a certain point.
When we consider that Zoological Psychology
has only of late years been placed upon a scientific
footing as an experimental Science the contributions
of investigators, up to the present time, have been
full of suggestiveness and value.
2. 'Phenomena to "be 'interpreted and their Tje'fInlt'ion
It. may be stated at once that only Phenomena
which can come within our mental purvieW objectively
can be the subjects of experiment in Zoological Psy¬
chology. In other words only those mental pro¬
cesses accessible to physical influences can be
dealt with. These are doubtless a small share
of the whole of the psychical processes of animals
9
but for a working hypothesis they would seem to be
sufficient. These phenomena come under the gener¬
ic names of Reflex Action; Instinct; and Intelli¬
gence; which embrace between them much that will
be referred to more in detail later on. It would
be well at this point, as far as possible, to de¬
fine the respective spheres of these great classes
of nervous reaction.
Reflex "Action."
The rather loose use of terms descriptive of
neural reaction is an unfortunate fault which is
altogether too common in text books on Comparative
Psychology. Wundt, for instance, in discussing
the reflex nature of the reaction to stimuli of
Protozoa, speaks of Protozoa a,h giving evidence of
('voluntary movement", How this is misleading, for
a voluntary action, properly so-called, implies
reflection and choice and is necessarily only pres¬
ent in beings of highly organised nervous system.
The word "voluntary" has to be sharply defined from
the differential reaction to stimulus which lowly
organised animals possess in place of a nervous sys¬
tem", but which, as we shall see, no less surely serves
a biological end.
Strictly speaking, Reflex Action, as stated by
Marshall Hall, implies a differentiated nervous
9
10
and. requires a sensory or afferent nerve connection,
a nerve centre, and a motor or efferent nerve con¬
nection. If we give the terms a more extended us¬
age as Hobhouse seems disposed to do, it can be
made to include the response to stimulus of many of
the lowest organisms, and even of certain plants, no
notably, Dros'era and the Sensitive. Oxalis, which
have, so far as we Know, 210 essential nervous sys¬
tem whatever.
In this broader definition of the term it might
be stated 021 the lines of Hobhouse's view as an in¬
variable and uniform reaction to stimulus. In tire
case of neither plant or Protozoa is there any evi-
dence of intelligence - in other words, no conscious
guidance. .''he reaction is a certain and invariable
result of an external stimulus; the basal fact prob¬
ably being the irritability of protoplasm. The
reaction is no more purposive in the case of the
ParamoB cium than in the case of the Venus fly-trap.
It would be Well, however, to restrict the use
of the term to a nervous system so far differentiated
as to posses an afferent nerve, a, centre, and an-.
afferent nerve. If we admit its functions as so
*
far purposive its structure is undoubtedly mechan¬
ical. All parts of the mechanism re-act together
in perfect harmony and without any adaptation on
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the part- of the reflex mechanism itself - 'qua re¬
flex act it re-acts inevitably for the benefit of
the organism. As Hobhou.se puts it, it is so at¬
tuned that "the manner of reaction adopted for each
stimulus is under ordinary circumstances beneficial
to the organism. Of the structure we may perhaps
say with certain reservations that it has grown up
because it is useful to the organism." (a)
In men and in the higher animals these reflexes
also persist but under different conditions. They
vary with the condition of the organism as a whole
and are markedly dependent upon their connection
with the higher nerve centres. These reflexes in
man reside in the lower nerve centres and are in
great part controlled and controllable by the con¬
scious guiding centres in the brain. Their pur¬
pose to the complex organisation of man being of not
nearly so vital importance as it is to the more low¬
ly organised animals.
Instinct.
There is probably none of the mental instincts
of animals and their expression in action rround
which so much controversy has raged and from which
so many divergent conclusions have been arrived at
as Instinct. The term has undoubtedly been used
as a confession of ignorance of many of the psychical
L.T.Hobhouse. "Mind in Evolution." p 33. 12
activities of animals up to a comparatively recent
time even by scientific men, and. by the lay mind
any attempt to bind it down to the common-place
rules of Evolution was regarded as an almost un¬
pardonable affront to the Deity. Instinct is
probably nowhere more in evidence to common obser¬
vation than in the various activities of birds.
The fact of -migration, for instance, which is even
now commonly attributed by many to a certain guid¬
ance of the Almighty's Hand, is found to be capable
of an altogether different explanation. This in¬
stinct is found to be in part at least due to the
gradual recession southwards, driven by the increas¬
ing northerly winds, of the multitudinous insects
which birds require as food. Birds in fact 'make
what is practically a conscious virtue of necessi¬
ty. In other words if they did not follow' the
gradually receding' tide of insects they would
starve.
This popular view of Instinct deals with it
exactly as it deals with "Reason" in man, as an
ultimate principle beyond the pale of discussion.
Let it be clearly stated at once that neither
Instinct nor Reason can thus stand alone, in a
state of isolation from the rest of nature, but
have to come into line with the view held by modern
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Psychology that they are, like all other mental and
physical activities, products of Evolution, serving
a biological end, and i'n intimate and unalienable
connection With them.
Instinct may be said indeed to be the cradle
or nursing mother of Intelligence. It is as im¬
possible to sharply define the territory of Instinct
as that of Reflex Action. Somewhere it enters the
stream of mental development in the sphere of Reflex
Action and thereafter it colours that stream along
its 'widening channel as far as we have be n able to
explore it in the highest forms of intellectual de-
ve1opment.
It has been we11 said by someone that theories
of Instinct are fas common as butterflies in summer"
and this after all is but natural if we look at the
wide scope for a variable interpretation of the same
phenomena there is in the realm of Instinct.
Aany of these theories may be said to merely
darken counsel with words. 'We rasa# at once dismiss
the theory which holds that Instinct springs into
being' a perfect organisation of absollit# and un¬
erring infallibility. Instincts are rarely perfect
from birth, and there are few if any which need no
alteration and which undergo no modification in the
lifetime of the individual. The instincts of suck-
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ling, nest-building and flying in birds are by no
means perfect at birth', undergoing variations ac¬
cording to circumstances, and, as we shall see
later, the more modifiable they are the more adapt¬
ed to serve the biological end of survival.
Probably at opposite poles of definition are
Mr. Herbert Spencer's that Instinct ia simply com¬
pound Reflex Action, and Mr. Marshall's, who holds
that we must embrace under Instinct an ethical',
artistic', and even religious emotion.
Others again class instinctive action with
Intelligence, involving consciousness of end. Wundt
defines Instinct in general as "movements following
originally upon voluntary acts which have become
wholly or partially mechanised in generic Evolution
or individual life." Thus following closely upon
Darwin's view that Instinct is inherited habit de¬
termined by Natural Selection.
Briefly, Wundt agrees with the view that In¬
stincts are "the mechanised rudiments of manifes¬
tations of Intelligence," and further' proceeds to
divide Instincts into what may be called the ordin¬
ary congenital type according to the definition
and into acquired or individual instincts. He
holds, and to a large extent with justice, that
nervous systems have a property of mechanising com-
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plex - originally voluntary - movements, these ap¬
pearing in the race in the course of countless gen¬
erations as congenital instincts and in the individ¬
ual as acquired instincts, instancing the mimetic
impulse in the social life of the higher animals as
a strong incentive to the growth of the latter.
Certainly in many social customs this is so', but it
is a question as to whether what is acquired ought
to be regarded as instinct at all. Lastly he iso¬
lates the connate instincts which he calls those of
sex ahd nutrition.
Hobhouse in his reent book would seem to define
it as a response of inherited structure to stimulus',
but will not allow that we must therefore identify
it with Keflex Action.
In the care of chickens by the hen, as he well
points oirt, there are many reflexes involved as iso¬
lated acts, notably - danger clucks - spreading of
wings to receive the chickens and so on. "Each partic¬
ular act may be described',! he says, "without obvious
violence as reflex, but the whole is an adaptive
combination of reflexes in which the combination is as
as i'mpprtant as each separate act." But beyond this
be believes that there is some permanent state or
tendency which we call maternal feeling or parental
instinct: thus differing in his conclusion from
ie
Spencer who would distinguish Instinct and Reflex
Action solely "by their relative complexity.
"Ir. and "Irs Peckham, two Very painstaking and
acevirate observes, in their monograph on the in¬
stincts and habits of the solitary vrasp, have well
defined instinct in the following terms:-
"All complex acts which are perform¬
ed previous to experience and in*a similar
manner by all members of the same sex and
race." (a)
This will be seen to exclude any idea of con¬
sciousness, which after all for the bare purpose of
definition it would seem better to do, as most in¬
stinctive acts are performed for the first time at
least without any possibility of conscious guidance
on the part of the individual.
Lloyd Morgan sums up these views in one, and de¬
fines instinctive behaviour as "comprising those
complex groups of co-ordinated acts which are in
their first occurrence independent of experience:
which tend to the well being of individuals and
the preservation of the race: which are due to co¬
operation of internal and external stimuli: which
are similarly performed by all members of the same
more or less restricted group of animals; but which
are subject to variation and to subsequent modifi¬
cation under the guidance of experience," (d)
(a) G.W-.& E.G.'Peckham. "On the Instincts 1 Habits of
the Solitary Wasp."
(b) Lloyd Morgan, "Animal Behaviour." p 71.
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how to deal With these extremely divergent
views, llr. Herbert Spencer's pronouncement that
Instinct is merely compound Keflex Action would
seem in the light of recent research to be inade¬
quate. Both Mr. Hobhouse and Professor Lloyd Mor¬
gan seem to experience difficulty in getting away
from this absolute view of the matter. And cer¬
tainly many acts classed as instinctive can quite
as reasonably be claimed for the Compound. Reflex
Theory. There is no objective evidence of what
Hobhouse calls "a persistent inward condition"
which co-ordinates and controls the many reflex acts
involved in a compound reflex.
This would include- under Reflex Action many of
the more complicated acts of insects. H. Fabre men¬
tions one which Hobhouse quotes', "A solitary wasp,
Iphex Fl-avipennis", which provisions Its nest with
small grasshoppers, when it returns to the cell
leaves the victim outside and goes down for a mo¬
ment to see that all is right. During her absence
M. Fabre moved the grasshopper a little. Out came
the Sphex, soon found her victim, dragged it to the
mouth of the cell and left it as before. Again
and again H. Fabre moved the grasshopper but every
time the Sphex did exactly the same thing until the
observer was tired out.
In this cas-.- or g'-us tnt m iform
IS
In this case one gets that uniform response to
stimulus which is the inevitable accompaniment of
Keflex Action. Opposite conclusions have been come
to , however, by o ther observers in the same cir¬
cumstances.
This view Would parallel Instinct with a com¬
plicated Keflex act .such as walking with the mind
absolutely preoccupied. Certainly in proportion
as they exhibit this fixed and unalterable response
instinctive acts approach the more mechanical ..pro¬
cess of Keflex Action. The difficulty in this class
of instinctive acts and the cause of much of the
controversy appears to be that no line of demarcation
between Reflex Action and instinct has been drawn
by Ilature. The one insensibly glides into the
other and their special characteristics becoming
blended produce a reaction which, so to speak, Is
neither reflex not instinct, but which can be view¬
ed as either.
Instinct is foundati'onally pre-determined res-
pose to stimuli with a biological end in view, but
Spencer's theory is not nearly comprehensive enough,
for leaving out of account for the moment any ques¬
tion of intelligent guidance in compound Keflex
Action, no matter how complex it be, there is at all
stages of development an unvarying response; while
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Instinct even in its lower forms shows some adapt¬
ability to circumstances, this being noted in the
course of many generations, so slow is it to change.
Reflex Action shows no cuch adaptability. But it
is when we come to the large class of instincts
where adaptation to circumstances occurs even in
the life of the individual that the inadequacy of
Spencers definition becomes apparent. The ground¬
work; of the action may be in a sense mechanical,
but there is something super-added, which differs
in some kind in individual cases, and in individuals
is adapted to the immediate matter in hand, dany
instances might be quoted to support this from ob¬
servations on spiders', caterpillars', and ants, and
more especiall^from their study of the solitary
wasp by the Peckhams. These careful observers
state clearly the pros and cons of the matter.
Their opinion is that instinct in these interesting
little insects is present in a great variety of
forms, from a dull unvarying response to a situ¬
ation to a plasticity of adjustment which bears
all the 'marks of intelligence.
The view that Instinct and Intelligence are
practically interchangeable terms seems even more
fallacious in its results than the compound reflex
theory. This erroneous view is the more readily
understood if we remember that intelligent action
- this being as we shall see later quite distinct
from intellect - arises somewhere within the sphere
of instinct. In the case of many instinctive
actions there can be no doubt that they are purely
instinctive only in their first performance, every
subsequent performance being coloured and modified
by the experience thus gained. Experience is the
key-note,.of intelligence, and an instinctive act
to begin with is not experiential.
Take Morgan's simple instance of the young
chick; here, ,a few hours after birth, the little
bird pecks at any small object within view. The
pecking is a pure instinctive act, set in operation
bv an optical stimulus - to put the matter shortly -
but the chick's initial efforts are frequently any¬
thing but accurate; as soon, however, as experience
steps in complete precision in pecking is rapidly
attained, and it is at this point, and here only,
that intelligence begins to operate; before this
there was no consciousness of end.
But there are many more complicated acts which
must be called instinctive and yet which show some
strange fore-knowledge and apparent purpose, chief¬
ly among the 1over invertebrates.
In support of this the striking instance of
the caterpillar of the Emperor Moth may be mentioned
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In this case there is shown an astonishing amount
of blind prevision and, according to some, of re¬
flection and understanding, in the elaborate care
which with an exit from its cocoon is provided; in
all this the caterpillar had had no experience and
could have learnt nothing from" parents.
As Hothouse puts it, "it is precisely the high¬
ly complex development of apparent purpose in cer¬
tain relations, combined with entire absence of any
corresponding manifestations of intelligence in
other respects that forces us to recognise th'e pur-
posaveness as only apparent." (a)
Inheritance, under natural Selection, as we
shall see, plays,.=no unimportant part in these com¬
plicated instincts, and any definition of instinct
must include this all compelling force.
Lowest in the scale we find instincts in which
no variation from the path appointed by heredity
tabes place. Variations from this straight and
almost unerring rule occur more and more as we pro¬
gress upwards until,in the light of experience,
which we saw was not inherited', we have an increas¬
ingly effective intelligent control, the instinct¬
ive act becoming indeed suffused with intelligence
throughout.
(a) L.T.Hobhouse. Mind in Evolution p 51.
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Instinct in general is raised above reflex
Action by the addition of what Hobhouse terras "the
persistent condition" and what Lloyd .'organ calls,
for want of a better name, "an organic prompting."
This consists of an emotional element of some kind,
experience is added', and with it the dawn of ihtelli
gent action appears.
'Intelligence.
For what we shall see afterwards is a
biological end Intelligence and Instinct for some
distance pursue a parallel course. Instinct provide
the crude, material in outline and Intelligence round
smooths and polishes it. The .more rigid and unvary¬
ing an instinct, is the less room is there for In¬
telligence to bring to play on it its power of ad¬
justment. On the other hand', the more capable of
variation the instinct is the more does Intelligence
adjust the action to the immediate need of the situ¬
ation. But it may be asked wherein lies the es¬
sential difference between Instinct and Intelligence
proper? Briefly, as has been stated by Lloyd Mor¬
gan, Instinct is antecedent to experience, it is an
animal's hereditary outfit; Intelligence is conse¬
quent on experience. Or , looking at'the matter
in a physiological light, in Instinct we have a
complicated machinery ready for use, a perfect ner-
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nervous co-ordination, Intelligence develops this
along certain lines during the lifetimes, checking
nervous activity in some' directions, stimulating
it,in others. Intelligence therefore is shown
in a modification of what Lloyd Morgan calls "be¬
haviour after experience". There can be no doubt
also that in Intelligence the emotional factor plays
an important part; pleasure and displeasure begin
to be more emphatically features of the situation,
and have a large s|iare in determining action. We
saw a crude emotional state was present in Instinct
as such, but was comparatively in the background;
in Intelligence, on the other hand", fee ling-states
play a prominent part in its development.
How", what are more especially the criteria of
*
Intelligence which mark it off from instinct? Com¬
plexity of adjustment it has been urged is one.
But as we have seen complexity and precision are
among the most wonderful attributes of instinctive
action. .any instances of this among insects might
be given, a notable one occurring in the habits of
the solitary wasps', in the construction of their
nests; their method of conveying the wounded in¬
sects and caterpillars to their nests, as related
in Dr. Beckham*s Monograph". But another and more
distinguishing test must be stood, and we have it
in the correlation between experience gained and
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subsequent action. An experience under which will
come sensations of pleasure or otherwise, motor-
adjustments, This has an effect in modifying the
response given to a similar 'stimulus. It is what
Lloyed I "organ calls novelty of adjustment and in¬
dividuality, the ability to perform acts in special
adaptation to new circumstances, - "the individual¬
ity manifested in dealing with complex conditions
or variable environment',1-these seem to be distinct¬
ive features of Intelligence. (a)
In order to do this there must be some dim and
elementary correlation. This correlation of experi¬
ence may be said to be the first upward step in
mental Evolution towards the correlation of ideas
which is man's alone on the conceptual plane. But
just as we tall; of a man's ideas becoming broader
so we have here a similar result on a lower percept¬
ual plane. There is a broadening of reaction, ac¬
cording to circumstances, which leaves the beaten
track of instinct far behind.
To prevent the confusion of terms which the use
of a word like "correlation", so largely employed
on the ideational level, might lead to', Professor
Stout has an admirable phrase which he calls "ac¬
quirement of meaning;" and illustrates it -with the
classical story of the Chick and Cinnabar Both. The
Chick
(a)Lloyd IIorgan', Animal Behaviour;pp 122,123.
having peached at Phis nauseous creature (the in¬
stinctive) and the resulting sensation being un¬
pleasant (sense-experience) on future occasions
modifies his attentions to the Cinnabar Moth to
such an extent as to dispense with the necessity
of repeating the original experience, and controls
the instinctive tendency to peck in that particu¬
lar case or a similar one owing to some re-presen¬
tation, however dim", of the previous occurrence.
Here obviously there is a correlation of events,
in other words the Cinnabar Moth has acquired mean¬
ing.
Here then, broadly speaking", is the point where
intelligence", including many manifestations to be
afterwards mentioned, first leaves the realm of
Instinct. Psychologically this state corresponds
to the perceptual stage and out of it is largely
built up the mental life of the higher animals',
the mental life of young children and, in certain
phases, the mental life of men. In it we can see
the germs of comparative judgment, of generaliza¬
tion and indeed much of the conceptual life of
man.
Where this capacity for learning by experience
first makes its appearance in the animal world is a
almost impossible to tell. Certain it is that evi¬
dences of it appear so low down as the Cephalopoda
and even some ITolluscs, but its range is not de¬
termined by a scientific classification of animals
according to their position in the vertebrate, or
-
invertebrate world from a morphological point of
view. Further than that we cannot go.
The perceptual stage of Professor Stout is the
direct and immediate result of experience, but
without a generalised conception of an ideal.
There' is intelligent control but not rational con¬
trol of motor and other impulses.
Aa a definition of perception is of vital im¬
portance for what follows', and as in my opinion
Stout's view of the perceptual process seems the
most cogent and lucid with which I am acquainted,
perhaps 1 may be allowed to give it in full:-
"Perception is essentially cognisant
we.'cannot perceive without perceiving some¬
thing perceiving is a special
mode of cognition, it is that special mode
which immediately depends on the actual •
presence of an object' to the senses . . .
. . . it is contrasted with that mode of
cognition which tabes place through ideal
images. Such images are not dependent on
the. actual presence of an object to the
senses. They are representations of ab¬
sent objects which have already been per¬
ceived thus existence of percep¬
tion is a pre-condition of existence of
ideal images. Direct cognisance of pres¬
ent objects must precede ideal represen¬
tation of absent objects." (a)
(a) Prof:G.F.Stout - lanual of Psychology, p 251.
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In other words, the stage of .mental Evolution
called Intelligence or in Psychological language,
perception, is distinguished by the presence of
concrete objects - their cognition - with resulting
motor activities. It is capable of unity and con¬
tinuity, when of a complex nature, thus differing
/ •»
from Heflex Action in which the responses are iso¬
lated and never continuous. There is adaptation
to a varying environment, and with it learning by
experience; unsuccessful modes of procedure are
eliminated; successful ones survive, and finally
there is some evidence of representation of images.
These facts are of some importance in the criticism
of some experimental methods to be afterwards des¬
cribed.
Although having no direct bearing upon the
matter at present under discussion a bare reference
to the Ideational stage is necessary.
Perception must be sharply distinguished from
this. Free ideas would undoubtedly apjjear to ex¬
ist in some of the higher animals; images of previ¬
ous experience, of an isolated and detached charac¬
ter, would seem also the be present in animal con¬
sciousness. They are largely present in human con¬
sciousness also, in fact the mental life of children
and of many of our fellow creatures would seem to be
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largely based upon such and their concern in "the im¬
mediate performance in hand. But the gulf between
the conceptual and the ideational in man, which un¬
doubtedly does exist,cannot be bridged by mere per¬
ceptual mentality, no matter how rich or how varied.
In conception the object is still concrete, but
we deal with the attributes of objects, We analyse",
compare, and generalize about them. Correlation is
here more distinctive and far reaching than in per¬
ception, and we argue not only by means of deduction
but of induction also.
In this paper we have nothing to do directly
with conceptual thought, and I merely mention it to
complete in the broadest and most general manner the
definitions and special distinctions of the various
mental processes to be discussed.
Conception, according to the line I have taken",
is no new faculty, it arises in direct genetic descen
from perception-
3. Biological Interpretation - natural Selection -
Inheritance.
Prom time, to time in these remarks a refer¬
ence to a biological end has been made, a.nd the im¬
portant bearing the mental life of animals has upon
ci
.-j y
upon this matter must be briefly referred to. The
biological test of survival operates no less strin¬
gently .in mental Evolution than in its physical
counterpart; and. the full significance of this ap¬
pears to have escaped the notice of biologists until
a recent date.
The stern examination of natural Selection with
adaptability to varying environment has to be pass¬
ed both by mind and body; indeed we may venture to
hazard that the capacity of the mental element in
the matter settles the fate of the purely structural
for weal or woe. The mammoths and huge saurians
of earlier days have been shown to be creatures of
comparatively' small brain, and for a time their
huge bulk' settled the issue in their favour; but
their mental processes Were not capable of intelli¬
gent adaptation and they had to succumb to weaker
but more intelligent products of Evolution. So
also we may-.note in the infancy of the human race
brute strength alone survived, but by slow degrees
Selection was operating upon mental development,
refining and rendering more subtle until mere phys¬
ical capacity had to give place to the more intel¬
ligent use of the possibly less vigorous organiza¬
tion. The most highly organised structure in the
body, the brain, with its concomitant psychical
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phenomena, has not yet. come into its own, hut is
slowly, very slowly, advancing to that end.
The part played by consciousness in the bio¬
logical end of racial survival is un3:nown to us
in the lowest members of the animal world; all we
can say is that their reactions to stimuli invari¬
ably seem to serve that end. ft is only when we
get to the more highly organised animals that the
value of conscious intelligence becomes fully ap¬
parent. "It is a commonplace of evolutionary doc¬
trine" says Morgan, "that other things being equal,
those races will survive, in the constituent members
of "which intelligent behaviour enables them to deal
most effectually with an environment of increasing
complexity." (a)
When experience has been gained its prompt
utilization to serve new situations is largely
the determining element. As I before stated, the
possession of organic structure of great size can¬
not alone determine firness to survive racially,
but rather, the use to which this is put by in¬
telligent direction of the end to be attained.'
The researches of Jenting would seem to have
shown that the various psychical activities with
which paramoecium has been endowed are carried out
without any conscious choice or purpose, in other
words, the animal reacts automatically; it assimi-
(a) Lloyd Morgan. Animal Behaviour.
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late's food, absorbs oxygen, and responds to stimu¬
li, all of which, according to the effectiveness,
contribute to its survival, but, as we have seen,
without consciousness. There is no conscious end
in view, but the end is somehow attained by the
pruning hook of natural Selection.
So too we say in the case of Reflex Action,
which, as we noted in defining it, implied a dif-
»
ferentiated nervous system; the organism is', as we
say, so built that way, that its reactions to stim¬
uli are in the main beneficial to it. In the
course of thousands of years certain types of re¬
action might prevail which have proved to be more
beneficial to the animal than others. Here the
part played by the nervous system, such as it is',
is one of great importance. Of course there can
be little doubt that, this method -must be a terri¬
bly costly one in the case of individuals, but
that is of no moment to the sifting hand of Bio¬
logical Evolution.
In Instinctive types of action the same process
can be followed if it be granted that structural
alterations take place in the course of generations
without any direct intervention on the part of the
individual or of the race', these structural changes
arising through heredity under the influence of
natural Selection, so too can the functions they are
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adapted to perform, which have been modified by en¬
vironment and the struggle for existence,. There
is thus a Biological correlation between the adapt¬
ation of structure and of function all along the
line. The flying fish to escape elimination has
evolved a specialized type of fin which fulfils
its object in short flights through the air, and so
enables the animal no escape its natural enemies.
Under this heading too trill fall the wondrous
evolution of protective mimicry seen in a wide:,
range of animal life. Instinct, as I have al¬
ready shown, has a conscious aspect, and there can
be little doubt that in proportion as Its instinc¬
tive activities are influenced by consciousness in
adaptation to varying environment the chances of
survival are increased. Take a group of animals
throw them into alien surroundings, in which their
ordinary instinctive response does not serve, and
refuse to grant them the saving grace of intelli-
ggent adaptation, the beneficial results of the
acquirement of meaning, in other words the con¬
scious aspect of things , and the chances are ,th'ey
will become extinct before long. Endow them
with this mental factor on the other hand, which
can be put into immediate action and temporise with
the strange environment until congenital variations
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have, after many generations, "begun to take effect,
and their chances of survival are correspondingly
increased. This adjustment being arrived at by the
few", the rest of the group would", if of a social
order, necessarily benefit by imitation. As used
in this sense, imitation does not mean reflective
imitation, as will be pointed out later, but that
which exists at the perceptual stage, that which
Professor §t©Ut 6'alli. sensgri-motor imitation.
The part played by consciousness in sexual se¬
lection, that most vital branch of Biology, is also
an undoubted fact. We need not here discuss
whether the appeal to the female is through n,hy
aesthetic faculty or is simply sense-excitaj,ion',
this is for the time immaterial. The point is that
consciousness in some form determines the selection
made by the female from among the many who pay her
court.
As the question of inheritance directly bears upc
the matter under it will be well at
this point to define my position on this debated
territory. Let me state at once that I give my
adherence to Weis--mann,i theory, meaning by that the
postulate of Weismann which asserts the perpetual
continuity of germ-plasm and with it the non-trans-
miss^bility of acquired characters. With his
second postulate the absolute stability of germ-
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plasm, We have in "this place nothing to do. The
first alone "bears upon the question of heredity.
v*
notwithstanding Romanes& brilliant Examination
of Weismannism'1, which undoubtedly points to one
signal flaw in the theory, to be immediately re¬
ferred to, it seems to me to have as an hypothesis
a large amount of plausibility.
Briefly, V.Weismann asserts the non-transmisin¬
ability of acquired character, that Pan-genesis
cannot be accepted, and that the continuity of
germ-plasm satisfies every requirement. In this
then the Lamarckian factor is absolutely discounted
there is no compounding with it in the least de¬
gree, and yet, as Romanes points out, he waives
again and again this absoluteness and submits
the possibility of some slight and occasional
transmission of acquired characteristics.. As
Romanes has remarked, there is a considerable dif¬
ference between a germ-plasm which is largely
continuous and one absolutely so. It does not
immediately•concern us here, however, whether
Romanes has proved the invalidity of the absolute
Weismann tMOTy or not. As I have already men¬
tioned, it will be well to accept it- as a working
hypothesis of heredity. According to this view
then we have the problem of variation's practically
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settled in the germ-plasm, outwardly manifested
however', in the mental and physical characteristics
of the possessor. These bodily structures form
the somatic elements, being sharply defined from
the germinal cells which alone are reproduced; As
*
"organ 'remarks"the former take no direct share in
reproduction, they are off the line of continuous
descent. They die without issue." But we saw
that Reflex Action, Instinct and Intelligence were
largely bound up in the perfect co-ordination of
the nervous system, which is a part of this somatic
element", which dies without issue; these are mot.
therefore in a sense inherited, but the germ-plasm
handed on to another generation is capable of re¬
producing a similar body and nervous organisation.
The immediate struggle for survival falls upon
the body alone, from this the germ-plasm is exempt.
And so we are once more brought face to face, with
the fact that it is iL'h the capacity of th# body f§P
intelligent adjustment to varying surroundings which
decides whether the germ-plasm in the particular
case is to be preserved or not. The body is the
product of a given germinal substance and accord¬
ing to the practical efficiency and use of the bodily
organs does natural Selection pronounce its fiat
as to the fate of the given germ-plasm for survival
35
or non-survival. Use of organs is a co-operative
factor with heredity on this basis, as affecting
the somatic elements. It is through use that
favourable modifications of acquired characters
take place, and it thus directly helps in. securing
the continuance of the germ-plasm.
4. Psycho1ogica1 Interpretation - The Principle
■ of donation.
It is on the importance of the Psychological
aspect of the behaviour of animals in the light of
Evolution that I would more particularly wish to
dwell. I have endeavoured to point out that from
a Physiological point of view and from a purely
Biological aspect all the activities of animals whicl
I have defined rest upon the fundamental basis of
Evolution by natural Selection. It is upon the v
value of the Psychological factor as helping to
determine the same Biological end that I wish to
insist in this paper. As I have already stated,
it has been too much neglected in estimating and
determining the status of the various species of
animals in the scheme, of Evolution. Under this
heading I shall also discuss the principle of
Conation -which Professor Stout has elaborated with
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so much care, and endeavour to .indicate its great
importance in the realm of Instinct and in that
of Intelligence. The principles of .Conation in¬
deed would seem to he an unvarying and inseparable
accompaniment of the psychical side of Animal ac¬
tivity.
It will be well to give Dr. Stout's own defin¬
ition of the Donative attitude in this connection:
"Such words" he goes on to say,
"as interest, craving, longing', yearning,
endeavour , desire', purpose, wish and will,
all mark this characteristic of the pro¬
cess of consciousness. All of them imply
an inherent tendency of conscious states
to pass beyond themselves and become some¬
thing different, an inherent tendency
which continues to operate, unless inter¬
rupted by interfering conditions, until
a certain end state is reached "which is
Called the satisfaction Or fulfilment of
realisation of these, emotions." (a)
With this end stags then Conation ceases. In
this Conative process emotional states and feelings
play an important part, more especially within the
scope of intelligent actions, although it is un¬
doubtedly present in instinctive action also. in¬
deed so low down as we can reasonably infer con¬
sciousness of any sort to exist this Donative atti¬
tude is a distinguishable feature. The Biological
end of animal activities is survival; the Psycho-
fa)
Prof:G.P.Stout. Manual of Psychology p.64.
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logical end, and inherent in it the end of Conation,
■is individual satisfaction or pleasure. By the end
of Conation herd I do not mean its actual terrain-
. • V
at ion- but- its goal of attainment. As Dr. Stout
remarts an important•distinction is to he drawn
here. The idea of winning a race is representa¬
tive of the .end of Conation in one sense; the race
having been ton is representative 'of it in the 'other
sense;, that is", Conation as'a process is ended in
satisfaction. This is of cours" on the Ideational
plane, but it serves as an example. ■
This state of endeavour to an end- is in 'all
cases, whether the end be recognised as such or- not',
one to avoid obstruction and secure success; in othe
words, individual satisfaction. That is', putting
it in psychological language, to avoid the affective
state of displeasure and ensure that of pleasure.
Professor Stout, in his Analysis of the sub¬
ject, does not seem to go below the level of con¬
scious endeavour; i.e.. the plane of Instinct with
super-added Intelligent adaptation. Certainly
the roots of the process on the Intelligent plane
would appear to arise in the.affective states of
.the animal, and. as below the leve.l of Instinct, so
far as our knowledge goes, there exist no such af¬
fective states, it would seem that as a demonstra-
ole force in animal life we must not seek for it
in more lowly organisms. And yet, may we not say
that a property of at least similar aim is present
in the dim sentience - if such there be - even of
the Protozoan, and in the reflex life of many of
the lower invertebrates; where, given an obstruc¬
tion, there is the continuance of a state of irri¬
tability, or what Dr. Stout would call in physio¬
logical language, a disturbance of nervous equil¬
ibrium, which goes on till the onstruction is re¬
moved. Haturally, the active side of the donative
attitude", the endeavour after a pleasurable end,
with its corresponding satisfaction, is not so easy
4r*
to prove, much less to demonstrate. But in essence
I take it, the irritability of protoplasm is the bed
took of Dr. Stout's donative process.
To its action and importance on the perceptual
plane of Instinct, and Intelligence I have already
referred; there remains to mention the correspond¬
ing effect on the Ideational plane. In the per¬
ceptual stage we saw that Conation was a conscious
and felt tendency or endeavour', chiefly in the motor
sphere, and that satisfaction was reached when the
end was obtained, but that there was no realization
of the end as such. There we had to deal with
impulses which were isolated, and determined by a
material and immediate objective. On the Ideational
level this is not so. Here the donative tendency
«*•
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is under control and. is considered ip relation to
the "total system of tendencies." There may very
easily be tVro or more donative impulses, but delib¬
eration is brought to bear in them and a decision
is come to in relation to the Ideal. We set be¬
fore ourselves an ideal of conduct and sometimes
consciously, though more frequently unconsciously,
strive after its attainment. It is in fact a new
aspect of an old matter, and simply brings us face
to face once more with another of the facets of the
many sided natural Selection; it is indeed part of
this great process. It would seem that in no
other way can we explain what is without doubt a
constant feature in all animal life.
'This Clonative stream of Energy, always making
for Evolution, is in marvellous consonance with
what we know of, or reason as being', the objective
of Natural Selection. Those animals endowed with
a strong force of Conative energy escape the' dread
fiat of elimination; those again in whom it is
feebly developed, if there be no countervailing
advantage, paying the penalty. The getting of
pleasure then and the avoidance of pain may be
termed the psychological contribution to racial
survival. If we consider one or two of
the activities of anaimals we can see in what won¬
derful agreement this all pervading tendency is
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with biological ends.
In his work on "The Play of Animals" Professor
Groos' very ably deals vrith this important phase of
Animal life, and has conclusively shown the bio¬
logical import of the seemingly purposeless and
random physical activities of play. The felt end
or motive in the animal?& mind, to put it thus, is
one of satisfaction of the pleasurable end; not as
one fitting it more effectively for the struggle
of life, adapting it to .meet new and every varying
contingencies, the animal does not study that, but
here is shown that marvellous consonamce of the
biological end before referred to and the indivi¬
dual satisfaction of the moment. We may not be
prepared to admit, some of the animal activities
'referred toyby Professor Groos as coming under the
scope of "play", but the underlying principle in
all cases is the same; that when the animal is", so
to speak, not actively engaged in the struggle for
existence., Natural Selection under Evolution cun¬
ningly interweaves this instinct of play into her
own great pattern and uses it thus indiredtly to
secure the biological end of racial survival.
It is in youth that the stream of donative En¬
ergy flows most strongly, and it is then that the ,
tendency to play is most in evidence - experimenta¬
tion - practice - curiosity .- the instinctive im-
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pulse to mock fighting (which is not the only
play activity of animals, as Prof. Wundt seems
to infer) - the periodic fits of half flying which
are so common among the young domestic fowls - the
sham hunting of the kitten by the domestic cat .-
these and many others are evidences of this ten¬
dency. But it is not only in youth that practice
is gained for the serious struggle of life; in
adult life in the intervals of the struggle the
same conditions prevail. The animal is as it were
playfully testing its harness of battle, strength¬
ening any weak points, and perfecting.itself in
the type of situation with which it is likely to
be confronted in serious life. And this is not to
be wondered at,' for it is vital to its very existence
and a situation inadequately dealt with in the real
struggle may mean the forfeit of its life.'
In the courtship of birds", although, strictly
speaking, there is no play-time, we may note a
similar state of affairs. We know for instance
that some birds begin to practise the love-song
quite eatly in the autumn in preparation for the
coming spring. This, I believe, is in brief, an
outline of the theory Prof. Groos advances in his
very philosophical work.
But, as Prof. Lloyd "organ points out, we are
too apt to lay stress upon the bodily skill dis-
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are too apt to lay stress on the bodily skill dis¬
played, the wonderful co-ordination of movement
shown in this form of animal and human activity",
and to lose sight of the fundamental psychological
element. He says:-
" Lightly considered
the behaviour itself is simply the out¬
come of a conscious situation, duly elab¬
orated and knit together throtagh the as¬
sociation and coalescence of its consti¬
tuent date it is a means to the
unification of consciousness by bringing
into relation scattered and at first quasi
independent sensoty and emotional elements
Success is only attained through the
concentration of attention and effort on
that which is the centre of interest and
also the focus of endeavour." (a)
We can thus see the co-ordination of end of the
psychological of animals with that of Evolu¬
tion, and the important share they fulfil in th'e
achievement of this end; this being especially il¬
lustrated by the instinctive activities of animals
in the sphere of play.
(ations
T. The Plea for C omnar is on - I) iver'gent Interpret-
Having thus hypothetically established the
claim, of the purely psychological side of animal
activity in Biological Evolution, there remains to
consider the arguments for and against the contin-
(a) Lloyd Horgan, Animal Behaviour p 313.
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uity of this mental factor through ascending stages
of development to its present .consummation in human
consciousness, when conceptual thought first comes
on the scene.
Incidentally I have referred to some of the
activities of the more intelligent animals as bear¬
ing some noted resemblance to those of men under
certain circumstances. The remainder of this
paper will be devoted to the proofs for the con¬
tinuity in Evolution of the mental processes of
man and those of animals", and a. critical account
of some recent methods of investigation.
While the doctrine of purely morphological
evolution finds ready adherents and few opponents
at the present time, wonder being frequently es-
pressed even by the lay mind that so simple and
obvious a thing could ever have been doubted, its
analogue in the realm of mind has received but
scant recognition.
After the long reign of materialism, Romanes
may be said to have been among the first in this
country to lay claim for the animal mind a place
which challenged comparison with that of man. He
founded what may be called the Intelligent School c
Animal Psychology, as opposed to the doctrines of
Wundt yfho would explain all the mental activities
of animals in terms of Association,
Admirable as are some of Romanes' investigations
in certain fields of animal life, it has been noted",
and justly I think,, that in his eagerness to do
justice to the mentality of animals', he was carried
too far, and appears to have interpreted in the light
of logical reflection many of the activities of anim¬
als which could quite well, and with no discredit
to the animals? concerned, be explained on the lower
level of Instinct or Intelligence. unfortunately
for the value of Professor Romanes' observations
as records in his "Animal Intelligence" and "Mental
Evolution in Animals" they are for the most part de¬
rived from unscientific sources, and he appears to
have accepted them, coloured as many of them undoubt¬
edly are by the exuberant imagination of his inter¬
ested correspondents. As Wundt observes, the facts
may be wholly true; the interpretation of the phil¬
osopher, innocently woven in with his account of
them, puts them from first to last in a totally
wrong light. A typical instance may be mentioned
Which Wundt refers to, it is a story of ant life.
"At one formicary half a dozen or more young
queens were out at the same time. They would climb
up a large pebble . . . face the wind, and assume
a rampant posture. Several having ascended the
stone at one time, there ensued a little playful
passage at arms as to position. They nipped each
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other gently with their mandables and chased one
another from favourite spots. They, however,
never nipped the workers. These latter evidently
kept a watch upon the sportive princesses, occasi¬
onally saluted them with. th^ir antennae in the usu¬
al. way or touched them on the abdomen, but appar-
II
ently allows them full liberty of action. As
Wundt remarks', there is certainly full licence of
imagination here. Such is in part the inevitable
result of the use of words and phrases which imply
analytical thought to describe mental processes
which involve no analysis.
In the work referred to Professor Romanes
would not seem to have adopted the critical atti¬
tude necessary in dealing with a mass of material
the observation of which shows anything but exact
psychological methods. Raulty and inexact obser¬
vation and an utter absence of experimental con¬
trol were the characteristics of much that was
done by this school in the sphere of comparative
Psychology.
We cannot too often remind ourselves of Lloyd
Morgan's principle that in no case is an animal
activity to be interpreted as the outcome of the
exercise of the higher psychological faculty if
it can be fairly interpreted as the outcome of
exercise -of one which stands lower in the psycho¬
logical scale." "
But Romanes is not the only offender in this
respect. His instances are confined for the most
part to a section of the Zoological world where
one would reasonably expect the high level of men¬
tal development so far as it goes.
To mention one other, let us go to the oppos¬
ite end of the scale, and we find K. Binet dis¬
covering in the daily life of paramoecium many
problems as complex as can be presented by our
own mentality. This author actually satisfies
himself of the existence of such mental attri¬
butes as senses, choice, memory, and intelligence,
to say nothing of his 'social scheme of life in
these organisms/ j shall deal with this in a
succeeding paragraph.
Professor Wundt, who deals with animal mental¬
ity as a subsidiary problem arising out of the con
sideration of human psychology, deals in no uncer¬
tain manner with the assumptions of the "Intelli¬
gence" School.
He would seek to explain in terms of simple
Association all the objective mental phenomena of
animals. In his view the criterion of Association
(a) Prof:Binet, The Psychic Life of Ilicro-organisms
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is that it does not extend beyond particular and
isolated ideas, however many they may be. He
grants that the wonderful association mechanism
which an animal develops is, even in some of the
invertebrates, of a most complicated character
but that it. remains an-association process all
the same. In- the case of the higher animals he
finds it more'difficult of application but never¬
theless endeavours to explain all their mental
activities in these terms.
Association of one sense impression with an¬
other thus covers the whole field of Reflex Action,
Instinct, and Intelligence', and is in .close corre¬
lation with physiological nerve processes. Wundt
would in all probability allow that individual sets
of association are acquired, and that there is
some inherited facility in the nervous system for
the establishment of this linkage of sense .teprfes-
sion with sense impression,to go no further. There
is no necessary and fixed co-ordination of certain
nerve cells and nerve fibres, as we may suppose',
in the case of Instinct, but rather that such is the
nature of nerve matter that connecting links of
individual acquirement are readily formed. In
our own mental life we are made aware of the same
process from day to day, and the readiness with
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which 'certain actions are, so to speak, stamped in,
is familiar.to .all, Professor Wundt also points
out the constant inter-action between Association
and Intellection in human life, and adds that by
practice anything can be reduced to Association.
"Trains of thought" he says, "which at first in¬
volved considerable intellectual labour are complet¬
ed with increasing certainty and mechanical facility
the oftener they are repeated."
Upon this process then Professor Wundt holds
that all the mental life of animals may be said to
hang. The effects"of Association do not go beyond
the connection of particular ideas whether direct¬
ly excited by sense impressions or only re-produced
by them.' Intellectual activity presupposes a de¬
monstrable formation of concept', judgment and infer¬
ence,. or an activity of the constructive imagin¬
ation", With all the restriction he imposes upon
the study of Zoological psychology, Professor Wundt
quite readily admits that animals give evidence in
nearly all aspects of their mental life that it is
the immediate precursor of our own.
Wundt, like the late Professor Romanes, views
the matter of animal psychology from the standpoint
of empirical human psychology. Romanes, however,
had made many observations, although as before point-
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ed out they seem to', lack scientific- restraint. It
does -not appear that Professor Wundt has specially
observed the /objective the-mental factor
in animals. In neither case were, the'conclusions
arrived at as the result of systematic experiment,
and this renders the evidence, except on the -most
general grounds, of an untrustworthy nature.
Wundt rightly points out the erroneous conclu¬
sions Romanes appears to have been led to in many'
of the instances he quotes', in granting the power
of.inference to animals when the more simple law of
association could explain them. But can we say
that Association explains everything in animal men¬
tality? Does not Wundt himself, in granting not
only contiguity-association but similarity-associ¬
ation, admit a certain perception of relations, and
thus the possibility of a certain attribute of mind
which has been called a "practical judgment"?
In association pure and simple the connecting
lin3:s are unalterably fixed as related to a series
of acts and will continue to operate after a con¬
siderable lapse of time. JTow Wundt, In support
of his theory, relates an experience with a poodle
dog of his, which it seems to me violates the very
rule in support of which he quotes it.
Briefly, the poodle was in the habit of cross¬
ing a river with his master in a boat. Qh@e he was
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left behind, and was compelled, much against his
inclination, to swim across. Some days later the
same accident happened, but, apparently objecting
to swim across again, he ran up and down the bank
whining, until seeing a strange boat pushing off
for the opposite shore he sprang in to it and ar-
rived dry-footed and happy. To explain this by
pure association is obviously straining the mean¬
ing of the term to fit the occasion in quite an un¬
justifiable manner. The keynote of ordinary asso¬
ciation in this case would be, not the getting across,
but the getting into the boat with his master. The
animal really seems to have left association behind,
selected the essential part, getting across - with
the end in view of rejoining his master; thus giv¬
ing every evidence, as we shall see later, that the
animal had some idea of fitting the means to the
end. But if it be granted that association will
explain most of the activities of animals already
mentioned, it seems practically useless in accounting
for some of the social instincts of the higher mam¬
malia. Without necessarily implying the sympathy
of an ideal conception, mutual aid rendered by one
animal to another when wounded surely goes beyond
the limits of mere association. Sympathy is shown,
not because the animal regards sympathy as a vir¬
tue, but because it i>urposes to relieve.
In Brehm'.s Thierleben' many. Instances of this
kind, are given.. The animal does not analyse its
intention in the matter but it certainly directs
its action to the practical end of affording re.-
lief. Hay more, the very foundations of human
self control may be noted in some animals, notably
in dogskin cases such as Hobhouse relates of dogs
impelled to bite under the painful dressing of a
wound checking the impulse and converting it into
a caress. This control of impulse, is therefore
not an absolute prerogative of human prntali^y,, al¬
though in the case of the animal it does not arise
from knowledge of an idea of right and Vrrong;, nev¬
ertheless, it cannot be said to harmonise With the
notion of a simple associative process.
VI. Importance of Observation and Experiment under
Controlled Conditions. - A' Summary of Results.
;'_-m - ' 1 m
It is only within recent years that the
importance of placing' psychology on the footing of
an experimental Science has been thoroughly appreci
ated. In Zoological Psychology this is doubly
needful, as in the absence of language objective-
evidences of mind arelail that we bane to go by,
O
Then these have to be re-translated into terms of
subjective experience. Observation alone in so
■wide and varied- a field as the psychical activities
of animals afford is almost bound to lead to fal¬
lacious results, and it is only when bached up by
experiment under properly controlled conditions
and capable of exact repetition that a reasonable
approach to accuracy can be expected. But experi¬
ment without due checking of results is equally
bad, and. the conclusions arrived at must be cor¬
roborated by wider observations in the same field.
Then the conditions of experiment must as far as
possible approximate to the natural habits of the
animals, as an unnatural strain in the surround¬
ings appears to discompose the animal with result¬
ing. abnormality of reaction. Then account must
be taken of individual difference, of the level
of intelligence, even in animals of the same spe.--
cies. This has been noted by the Peckhams in their
study of the habits of wasps, and is a factor dif¬
ficult to discount except by dealing with a great
mass of material and so striking an average. Then
non-acquaintance with the training and previous
life history of the animal will introduce another
discrepancy which is almost impossible to overcome
unless the animal has been observed from its birth
onwards. This has been done more particularly by
Small in his study of the young white rat; in the
higher animals it is naturally much more diffi¬
cult.
Valuable work has been done in several sections
of the wide field open to investigation in Sompara-
tive Psychology, and although at the present time
the objective and experimental study pf mind in an¬
imals from the standpoint of Evolution is only in
its infancy, the work already done by Thorndyke"-,
Small, Lloyd Horgan', Wesley Hills', Hobhouse and
others has opened up a territory of transcendant
interest, in which may lie the solution of much
that is at present apparently inexplicable to the
Evolutionist concerning the whence of human mental¬
ity and the whither of the 'mentality of brutes.
The key to the mysteries of Evolution is," 1" ..
maintain', hidden away in the secret recesses'of
mental development, Nervous tissues, we saw, were,
from their earliest differentiation, of paramount
importance in the modification of structure, whether
it be in the mere reflex of the' lowest inverte¬
brates, or in the highly organized-cerebrospinal■
system of mammalia. But it is not nervous tissue
in the strict physiological sense of the word that
brings this about. It is its alter ego or Correla¬
tive, the psychological element; whether this be
the quasi sentience of the invertebrates, the in¬
telligence of the higher animals, or the Ideation¬
al life of man. That this mental factor, whatever
it "be, operates even before consciousness comes
into the field I have already shovm. When, in
what way, and at what point consciousness first
enters the arena we cannot tell, and all efforts
to elucidate this can only end in a confession of
failure.
Let me notice first Mr. Jenning's researches
on the behaviour of paramoscium, which is perhaps
one of the most typical of its class, the infuso-
rians. Anatomically, paramoecium is readily
described; it consists of a single cell, rather
almond shajjed, and about an eighth of a millimetre
long; the entire surface of the animal is covered
by waving hair-like cilia, which keep it In a
state of constant activity. At its lower part
there is a kind of intussusception or funnel, in
which the cilia wave inwards; this serves as mouth,
generative, and excretory apparatus.
Mow, as I mentioned earlier in this paper,
various interpretations, some of them quite intel¬
lectual in character, have been deduced from the
activities of this little creature. The animal
feeds upon masses of bacteria almost entirely, but
how do they choose their food? "If paramoecia",
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says Jennings, "are placed upon an ordinary slide,
such as is used for examining objects with the mi¬
croscope, -together with a small bit of bacterial
gggglea, and the whole covered with a- g over glass,
it will soon be found that all the paramoecia,
which were at first scattered throughout the pre¬
paration, have gather closely about the mass of
zooglea and 'are feeding upon it. it will be seen
that many paramoecia., which cannot on account of
the crowd get near enough to the mass to touch it,
are pushing closer and'shoving their more fortunate
brethren, all apparently trying to get as near the
delicacy as possible." .... Here 'we have a re¬
lated problem. Similarly, .he goes on to say that
if we mount them without bacteria, another phenom¬
ena singularly like the behaviour of human beings
occurs, i.e. the scattered paramoscium soon collect
into bodies or assemblages. "It appears" says
Jennings', "as if they did not enjoy being alone',
and had passed the word along to gather and hold
a mass-meeting in some part of the preparation."
There are other indications too of the beginnings
of social conditions in these interesting little
creatures.'
Further', the paramoecium seems to have prefer¬
ences in taste. Any solution with a faintly acid
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reaction being favoured by them, and anything al¬
kaline in reaction being apparently shunned. They
seem too to exercise choise of temperature. Can
the complex psychology apparently thus forced upon
us be explained in any other terms? Dr. Jennings
proved that it can, and has shown, by a study of
the structure of the animal, that the direction
of the strokes of the cilia in the oral groove
alone determines the ingress of food, that this
is quite automatic and that no choice is exer¬
cised. There is no selection, pieces of blotting
paper', sponge', cloth, and other fibrous bodies,
ail find their way into the gullet, so long as they
are capable of passing along it. The animals col¬
lect too round these various materials just as they
do in the case of their natural food, the bacterial
zooglea. It is a mere organic response', arising
from contact with any substance, and consists in
a cessation of action of the general cilia of the. >
body, those of the oral groove alone working.
Dr. Jennings disposes of the alleged social
customs, memory, preference in taste", and other
attributes of the higher mentality in one or two
interesting experiments. In general the result
arrived at was that a faintly acid reaction at¬
tracts the paramoecium, that carbon ..dioxide in
particular exercised an atrra'ctive influence.
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Now paramoecium itself excretes GO.2, and
the amount excreted was shown by chemical reaction
to be appreciable. A drop of water in which para¬
moecium were mounted was coloured by rosol - a
substance decolourized by CO.2, and producing'no
ill effect on paramoecium. The result was instruc¬
tive. Where the groups were collected the reddish
tinge fades and disappears, and as the groups fegrm
to break,up the colourless area expands also. The
paramoheia swim back and fore in the colourless
area, which increases coikcidently with their move¬
ments. Then too, the finding of any given object
and the subsequent grouping round it was found to
be entirely due to the random movements of the an¬
imal - the excretion of CO.2. at the same time tak¬
ing effect. ■ The attraction to certain re-agents
and conditions and the repulsion from certain
others is accounted for in a manner by no means
exemplifying choice, as appears on the surface.
How then does, a drop of attractive solution
affect the animal? "Exact observation" says Mr.
Jennings, "of the method by which the paramoecium
enters such a drop shows that this question (of
choice) is based upon a false assumption. Thfe
animals do not turn towards the drop .... the
paramoecia may be seen in their random course to
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almost graze the edge of the drop without their
motion being changed in the slightest degree. They
keep straight on past the drop and swim to another
part of the slidB . . . some of the paramoecia, in
their random swimming', come directly against the
edge of the drop, these do not react, but keep on
undisturbed across it. But when they come to the
opposite margin,1 where they would if unchecked
pass out again into the surrounding medium, they
re-act negatively - jerking back and turning again
into the drop. Such an anim&l then swims across
the drop in a new direction till it again comes to
the margin, when it reacts negatively as before,"
Thus it is clearly seen that the animals are not",
in an intelligent sense of the word, attracted by
the fluid of which the drop is composed', they en¬
ter it solely by chance.
In the case of a drop of repellant solution,
there is a reversal of the cilia, and swimming s
straight backwards, the animal at the same time
revolving ori its long axis in a direction opposite
to that in which it was previously revolving. It-
then turns through an angle and moves forward a-
gain, frequently with the result of again and again
striking the 'repellant drop. There seems to be
no localization of the stimulus, what occurs is
merely a result of stimulation, and that this is
60
the case has been shown by immersing the animal in
a solution, which, as a whole, acts as a source of
stimulus. Here there is no obstacle to be avoided,
and therefore no especial reason for swimming back¬
wards . The first thing paramoecium does in every
case is to reverse the cilia and swim backwards, and
this is so of all classes of stimuli. i)r. Jennings
sums up his results as follows:-
"A strict parity is to be observed
between the reactions of paramoecium and .
those .of an isolated frog's muscle. Para¬
moecium responds to any stimulus by a def¬
inite, well- characterised reaction . . .
Reaction in such a manner as to show a re¬
lation to the position of the stimulating
agent has been rightly regarded as the first
and lowest step in perception . . . This
lowest step is quite lacking in paramoecium
. . . . An animal that learns nothing, that
exercises no choice in any respect, that is
attracted by nothing and repelled by noth-
thing, that reacts entirely without reference
to the position of external objects, that
has but one reaction for the most varied
stimuli, can hardly be said to have made'
the first step in the Evolution of mind,
and we are not compelled to assume con¬
sciousness or intelligence in any form to
explain its activities," (a)
The nature of the activities of many other
unicellular organisms may be demonstrated to be of
essentially the same unvarying type as this.
(a) H.S.Jennings. "The Psychology of a Protozoan"
(American Journal of Psychology)
1899.
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It is a wide step from the Infusoria to the
Hymeno.ptera, but it is in this class that the sec¬
ond gjf the series of phenomena I have already de¬
tailed is most emphatically and characteristically
displayed. What the present Lord Avebury has done
for the more reasonable view of the instinctive
activities of ants in particular', the Peckhams have
accomplished in their observations/ of thehinstincts
and habits of the solitary wasp. Fheir's has in¬
deed been a notable contribution to the better in¬
terpretation of the Word Instinct.
Dr. 'Peck-ham's observations have proved among
other things that stinging, the taking of a particular
kind of food,' the method of carrying prey, and of
taking.the prey into its nest, are all instincts of
a well defined character; each species having its
own invariable method of stinging, its own heredi¬
tary preference in regard to fobd, and so on.
In the case of stinging, the careful and intelli¬
gent observations of the Peckhams have shown that
there is none of the "precise anatomical and physio¬
logical knowledge" of delivering the sting only in
the nerve centres, that Romanes and others seem to
have noted. The nerve centres are not stung with
a certain uniformity of this sort', and in some cases
it has been shown that paralysis and death follow
even when the victim has been stung far from a nerve
centre. ' According to the Peckhams, the primary
purpose of stinging is to'prevent resistance and
so prevent escape, as in the matter of food, each
species has some modification of its own in the
manner of stinging.
The carrying of prey to the nest is relatively
uniform in method', "but in getting the prey into the
nest the wasps show in individual cases a consider¬
able originality of method in attaining their end,
and deal with the emergency presented by the dif¬
ference 'in size of the victims in the most practi¬
cal manner. In one of the instances given by thern
and quoted by Hobhouse "the waspwas.holding .its
victim (a spider) by the under side of the body,
the venter being towards the hole, and the legs
being spread out stopped its entrance. A moment's
tugging convinced her that this would not do, and
she then turned the spider over, holding it by the
back, whereupon the legs at once folded themselves
across the under side of the thorax, and the spider
was drawn out of sight.
Still more remarkable was the following in¬
stance of a wasp which actually seemed to compare
the relative size of its .hole and the spider before
trying to pull the latter in, Mr. Peckham relates
it thus: , , , , "presently she went to loo]: at her
nest, and seemed to be struck with the thought that
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had already occurred to us - that it was decidedly
too small to hold the spider. Bach she went for
another survey of her bulky victim, measured it
with her eye without touching it, drew her con¬
clusions, and at once returned to the nest to make
• it larger .... this seemed a remarkably intelli¬
gent use of the comparative faculty."
But .if these cases of extraordinary adaptation
of means to end occur, showing great plasticity
of instinct, a plasticity which cannot be described
as other than intelligent, the same observers re¬
late 'many actions which', in the light of intelli¬
gence", seem strangely irrational. It seems as if
these little creatures, so amazing in their adjust¬
ment to circumstances in some cases, yet in others
are positively the victims of a blind and seemingly
senseless .instinct. It woiild appear also that
any disturbance of the plan of action, predestined
and pre-formed by instinct, quite threw the animals
out of their reckoning".
In a more recent paper by the-same observers
these facts are borne out more fully by a number
of typical instances presenting the same general
features of interest. (a)
Starting from the assumption that Genetic Psy¬
chology has more to hope for in the study of the
(a) Peckham, Additional observations on the Instincts
& habits of the solitary wasp." 64-
development period of young animals of all species
than from the adult stage, Mr. Willard Small has
■made some painstaking investigations on the psychic
development of the "white rat. (a) (Mr. Small has
published a later and fuller account of his experi¬
ments The Jourhalof Psychology in 1900, which" I
have not been able to refer to.)
Mr. Small kept a close and accurate diary of the
life of a number of young rats, from the day of
birth until the 28th day, and he gives his observa¬
tions in detail.
A notable fact would seem to be that there are
very few", if any,congenitally perfect instincts in
rats. Indeed, were it not for maternal solicitude
the young would be at a considerable disadvantage
in this way. One of the first psychical activities
noted was a desir'a for warmth, which is undoubtedly
the occasion of the characteristically social habit
of "huddling."in rats.
Sucking", Mr. Small found", was not congenitally
perfect; the young finding the mother's teats largely
by accident, even the sense of smell, which so early
develops in rats, playing no part in the discovery.
This rapidly improved by practice.
(a) Small. Motes on the psychic development of the
young white' rat, (American Journal of Psychology)
1899.
65
Small, as was "to be expected, was noted at
a very early stage, within three or four hours of
birth. At first the reaction to pleasant and un¬
pleasant odours, such as violet and cheese', ate
exactly similar; after a day or two some discrim¬
ination is shown. Indeed on the 4th day the re¬
action to asafoetida was rapid, and showed marked
dislike. On the other hand, in four cases out of
five, there seemed to be pleasurable response to
the cheese odour.
Mr. Small notes three distinct stages in the
rat's sense of smell; (1) Extreme semsitiveness
when all olfactory stimulation is dispieasurable.
(2) An indifferent stage. (3) Discrimination of
those odours associated with food and those not so
associated. He has also elucidated an important
point, that the association of certain smells with
foodstuffs is not necessarily experiential, but that
in the case of Gheese and .Milk especially there
seems to be a sort of instinctive selective faculty.
Dealing with the instinctive activities of rats,
Mr. Small lays stress upon the fact that there are
practically no perfect instincts at birth, and
dwells also upon the conditioning; of Instinct by
the development of the neural muscular system.
He gives as a tentative definition of Instinct
"an organic impulse, affecting through the neural
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muscular definite purposive motor ends."
Perfect instinctive activity is this plus definite-
nes's of movement gained by the axercise of the
function.- . Phis is, in all essential respects, a
part at least of the definition of Instinct I ac¬
cepted at the beginning of this paper.
dr. Small seems to see in the "huddling" of
rats - already referred to as being one of their ■
most characteristic instincts "when young, as in¬
deed. it is throughout life, one of the rudiments
of the social system; and this is worth remarking
from the point of view of out present study.
In the matter of play, hr. Small is not disposed
to follow Professor G-r-oos unhesitatingly, and goes
so far as to suggest that many of the p-lay. activi¬
ties (of rats in particular, I take it to mean) may
be'merely survivals or rudiments of old activities
now functionless and purposeless, but persisting
more especially in young life, and as not being
preparatory for the serious business of life and
the exercise of those organs which make more es¬
pecially for survival.
In regard to effective states, lr. Small re¬
peats what has been often noted before, that an
animal has no instinctive Pear sense. This is
certainly a striking fact when applied to rats.
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He points,outhowever, that with the functioning
of the ear and eye of the young rat, the sense of
fear appears in some form, quite apart apparently
from any experience,
A matter especially worthy of notice is the
mutual service of rat for rat by licking and pick¬
ing vermin; this being perhaps a dim foreshadow¬
ing of the altruistic principle in human character.
That very prominent trait of rat character -
Curiosity - is, it seems to me, rightly attributed
as serving a biological end of safety, quite as
naicA as the ends of nutrition. Mr. Small, in con¬
clusion, points out the extremely rapid growth of
a helpless organism into one able to adapt itself
to surrounding conditions. A life, full of motor
and emotional instincts gradually evolved and per¬
fected, possessing the inception of a" social ex¬
istence, and the claims of mutual assistance and
forbearance,
I must pass new, omitting, for the sake of
brevity, many grades of animal life and intelli¬
gence, to the conclusions arrived at from the
study of the mental pro£«&ases of the higher mam¬
malia, including the primates.
This stage more especially corresponds with
the third of the great classes of mental activity
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I have already detailed, namely Intelligence,
This field is perhaps the one which has been
most fully investigate, but with conclusions as
divergent as the poles. Mr, Thornd-ili©, Professor
Lloyd Morgan, Prof. Wesley Mills, and latterly
Mr. Hobhouste, have all stated their views on this
.matter, as the results of experimental work. Per¬
haps a reference may be allowed to the experi¬
ments of one or two of those mentioned, and first
those of Mr. Ttooraidifce. (a)
The views of this observer in the experimental
field of psychology, correspond with those of Prof.
Wundt in the theoretical; i.e. he would reduce all
the mental activities of animals to Association.
The experiments consisted chiefly in placing
cats, dogs', and chickens, .when hungry, in various
typii teexii and ©nelosuares, from which they
could escape and obtain food, by the manipulation
of some simple piece of mechanism', well within
their physical powers, but otherwise novel to their
experience - such as pulling a cord, depressing a
lever etc. The animal was put in the enclosure",
food was left outside, and his actions observed.
"Besides noting his general behaviour, special
(a) ThorndiKe. Animal lnl ,v 1 " "telligence.1898
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noticre was taken of how he succeeded in performing
the necessary act, in case he did'succeed; and a
record was kept of the time that he was in the box
before performing the successful pull or clawing
or bite." • . If on the other hand', after
a certain time the animal was not successful he
was taken out, but not fed; and if after a suf¬
ficient number of trials he still failed to get
out, the case was recorded as one of failure. Mr,
Thorndyke especially remarks the state of hunger
in which the animals were kept.
Besides other advantages, Mr. 1'horndik:® claims
for his method that no personal factor is intro¬
duced, save in • observation and interpretation -
surely an important enough qualification of its
merits.
ffihe apparatus in general, for the cats, consist¬
ed of a box 20 inches long, 10 inches broad, and 12
high, and a number of ingenious.attachments,>w&thiR
the limits mentioned', were used in several cases
for opening the door. At first there v/ere vigo¬
rous and random efforts to escape by clawing and
biting at everything. In the course of these
movements, sooner or later, an accidental success
brought about the desired result of escape, and
gradually, by repetition of the act, there was a
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stamping in of the successful impulse and an elim¬
ination of the unsuccessful; so that at last, by
what Lloyd Morgan calls. "The Trial and Error Meth¬
od", a perfect association came to be established
between a sense impression of the interior of the
box and that particular impulse with resulting
freedom and food.
Similar experiments were made with dogs in lar¬
ger boxes,, but do not appear to .have given such
satisfactory results. In discussing the question
of reason or inference in the animals, in their
efforts to escaj>e, Dr. Thorndik'e lays great stress
on the nature of the time-curve or record', which
to him seems to point conclusively to the absence
of inference in the minds of the various animals
experimented upon^ He points out that when one.
success had been attained, if we premised inference,
the animal ought not to fail again when, confronted
with the same situation soon afterwards. There,
ought to be, ha considers, if reasoning be present,
a sudden descent of the time-curve, maiming the
instantaneous and jreil defined action of a ration¬
al decision. But this is not so; the gradual slope
of the time, curve thus .shows the absence of reason.
In none of the experiments was there any sign of
abstraction or comparative judgment.
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Imitation.
The importance of this psychical process
and its results for biological ends has been recog¬
nised by all comparative psychologists. But, ac¬
cording to Mr. Thorndifce, the specific kind of Imi¬
tation has not been sufficiently differentiated.
In his view; of animal imitation he rules out of
court the imitative sounds of birds, also the imi¬
tative action of young birds in following the ex¬
ample of the parent bird, in which case he considers
instinct and experience between them satisfy ail re¬
quirements without resorting to imitation for an
explanation.
Dr. Thorndike's experiments led him to the con¬
clusion that in animals below the primates there is
no such thing as imitation by "transferred associ¬
ation," in other words there is no reflective imi¬
tation. Indeed he seems to find small room for the
imitative faculty in the higher mammalia as an aid
to their intelligent acquisition of experience. In
this connection experiments Were made with chicks,
cats, and dogs.
Keferring more particularly to the experiments
with cats,. Dr. Thorndyke's plan was as follows:-
The experiments were so arranged that Cat ITo.'2
was able to see Oat Uo.l perform the action necessary
to
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to enable it to escape from a box and get food. This
action was repeated a number of times, the observer
noting the number of times that Cat Ho.?, had his
eyes clearly fixed upon Cat TTo.T, vrho was apparently
an expert at getting out of the box. Cat Ho.2 was
then put into the box', and the time which he took'
to escape, after thus having the advantage of? seeing
the other animal do so was duly noted. Dr. Thorn-
diilie's conclusions would show that the conduct of
Cat Ho.2 .in his efforts to escape was in no way in¬
fluenced by what he had seen. There were several
other experiments of the same nature, all bearing
out this, conclusion. In other words, the animal--
was unable to form an association leading to an act
from having' seen another perform this act in the same
situation.
"Till the primates," says Dr. Thorn<$;i'kq, "we
get practically nothing but instinct and individual
acquirement through impulsive trial and error.
Among the primates we also get acquisition by imita¬
tion," And Dr. Thorndike concludes that no an¬
imal can form an association leading to an act un¬
less there is included in the association an impulse
of its own which leads to the act. What Dr. Thorn-
dake intends to cohvey by the use of the word "im¬
pulse" is the direct feeling of innervation which
accompanies the actual performance of the action.
73
The same unsatisfactory results were obtained
by him' in putting the animal through the action.
There was no learning of the process any quick¬
er, in other words, instruction had no effect, and
never succeeded in getting the animal to change
its own method for his. This also showing, accord¬
ing to his theory, that the animal's own innervation
Was needed to establish the association and so faci¬
litate the action.
31r. ThorndpSe then goes on to elaborate his
view of the stage of mentality implied in the asso¬
ciative processes of animals, as borne out by his
experiments. "The groundwork of animal association
tion", he concludes, "is not association of ideas,
but association of idea, or sense-impression', with
impulse," While not admitting the presence of
memory of events in time and space in animals, that
is, ;a memory judgment, he gives it as his opinion
that animals do have re-presentations of some sort,
and consequently ideas, but that such are confined
to narrow and rigorous lines.
From some further experiments, Dr. Ttoorndpie
comes to the conclusion that animals do not form
similarity associations, which, he states, involve
conception and generalisation.
The experiments were on the familiar lines al¬
ready described, that is, the means of escape from
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the'box was by pulling a loop, this loop being, in
two or three instances , totally different in size
size and appearance. The experiments, according
.to Dr. Thorndyke, indicated that the animal had no
generic notion of the thing "loop", in other words,
that the cat in the box did not discriminate be¬
tween the to be pulled and react to the es¬
sential. The reaction, he asserts, was due to "a
vague, ill-defined sense impression", utterly dif¬
ferent from the accurately defined sensations of
human discrimination, "In general" he says, " the
unit of their consciousness, apart from impulse
and emotion, is a whole association series. Such
soil cannot grow general ideas, for the ideas, so
long as they never show themselves, except for a
particular practical business, will not be thought
about or realised in their nature or connections."
He further states that it is only a small
share of human association that can in any way be
compared with animal association; that even leaving
reason out of account, there are tremendous differ¬
ences between man and the higher animals. The
associations of man are naturally far more complex,
delicate, and numerous, and the animal's method
of attaining these qualities is one which man uses
only in a limited part of the field.
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Finally, he abates that he doss not believe
animals have ideas of another's feelings of pain
or pleasure. That such must always be an abstrac¬
tion, something thought about', - not a mere sense
presentation - and, as such;, ..is outside the range
of animal consciousness.
In a more recent monograph on the mental life
of the monkeys, (a) Dr.' Thorndike continues his in¬
vestigation of the matter. Lxrerim'ents'were
carried out on similar but rather more advanced
linesjand dealt with the behaviour of the animals
in learning to get into boxes containing food, the
door of which could be opened by some simple mach-
anism, in learning to obtain food by other simple
acts, and discriminating' between two signals. The
rapidity with which the various tricks were learnt
was most pronounced in comparison with that dis¬
played by the cats and dogs. There was frequent¬
ly "a sudden acquisition by a rapid and often in¬
stantaneous abandonment of unsuccessful movements
and a selection of the appropriate one, which rivals
in suddenness the selection made by human beings
in similar performances," So marked was this, that
even Mr,. Thornd$.ke admits a natural tendency to at-
tribut to monkeys a totally different mental func¬
tion from that of cats and dogs, namely, the possess—
'
sion of free ideas, instead of vague sense impres¬
sions .
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Thorndike. "The ental Life of the Donkeys.''
psychological lieview 1901.
And while denying the national consciousness
to monkeys in any form from his results, he suggests
that reason is but a secondary result, of the general
function of having free ideas in great numbers, and
allows thatomonlfeys do seem to possess the first
beginnings of such free floating ideas.
The tests for learning from tuition and imita¬
tion, the distinghishihg tests fen discrimination,
seem to be inconclusive, although he states that
there was no very marked advance in these particulars
upon cats and dogs. It was in the animal's own
method of learning that the great difference was
emphasized.
Dr. Thorndjke's conclusions briefly are - that
the monkeys do represent progress in mental develop¬
ment towards man in their focalized vision; their
more complete co-ordination of movement, and their
general physical and mental activity. Whereas',
their method of learning was the same, there was
a notably quicker formation of association, a greater
number, and those of greater complexity and greater
permanence. He adds:-
"Let us not wonder that thej.oply
demonstrable intellectual advance of mon¬
keys over the mammals in general is the
change from a few narrowly confined prac¬
tical associations to a multitude of all
sorts, for that may turn out to be at the
bottom the only demonstrable advance of
man, an advance, which in connection with
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a brain acting with increased delicacy
and irritability, brings in its train
the functions which mark off human
mentality from that of all other an¬
imals." • ■
The position of Prof. Lloyd Morgan on the
debated question of the nature and status of animal
mentality,, as defined-by him in "Animal Behaviour",
seems to be in essential agreement 'with that adopt¬
ed by Dr. Thorniifeg. "The method of animal intelli¬
gence" he says', "is the method of varied trial and
error, with the utilization of chance success."
The establishment, in fact of associations which
lead to success - success in this case meaning sat¬
isfaction; he holds that there is no evidence of
the problem being .considered .in all its relations
with a view to ascertaining the essential nature
of the difficulty, that there .is', in other words",
no reflection such as exists in the ideal scheme
of reason.
Prof. Morgan quotes some experiments 'with dogs
which appear to bear out his view of the matter to
the fullest extent.
Dr. Stout, in his recent Manual of Psychology",
would also seem from independent observation to
have arrived at precisely the same conclusions as
Dr. Thorndyke. "The vast interval" he says, "which
separates human achievements, so far as they de-
p .nd upon human intelligence", from animal achieve-
78
ments, so far as they depend upon animal intelli¬
gence, is connected with the distinction between
conceptional and ideational processes. Animal
activities are either purely perceptual or, in so
far as they involve ideas, these ideas only serve
to prompt and guide an action in its actual exe¬
cution on the other hand, man constructs
in his head, by means of trains of ideas, schenes
of action before he begins to carry them out."
With Mr. Thorndike he agrees that success is only
attained in the case of animals after a great
deal of tentative groping', and when attained, that
it by no means follows that the same action will
invariably result in success on future occasions.
It may do so by vary gradual elimination of un¬
successful methods. He points out that if the
first success was in any way dufe to inference, all
subsequent trials should take a minimum time.
Even though he insists that fatuitous success
explains much or all of the intelligent actions
of animals', Dr. Stout admits that in human life
there are many occasions on which an exactly anal¬
ogous form of intelligence is in constant operation
This is undoubtedly the case. Take for instance
in the game of Cricket, a bowler who has attained
a certain pitch and "break" 'which has proved most
successful from his point of view; he has attained
Li
success by the tentative groping Dr. Stout refers
to. The method of trial and error has given him
a certain dexterity through practice, but he would
be quite unable to teach his method by the aid of
comparison. This much then is admitted by the
opponents of intelligence in animals in the wider
sense, that the parallel, though limited, in human
life, is absolute so far as it goes.
Widely different are the conclusions arrived at
by a recent investigator in the same field, Mr. L.
T. Hobhouse, which', before offering any criticism,
1' must briefly refer to. (a)
The experiments were begun with dometic animals,
but afterwards embraced a variety of animals from
the Manchester Zoological collection, including jL
monkeys and elephants. The rnetod was similar in
its general features to those already mentioned;
the endeavour being to find out whether an animal
could learn by perception of results. In this
case the animal had to obtain food by opening a box
:-by some, means", or'9j food was placed out of reach,
yet which could be obtained by pulling a string.
The animal was first allowed to discover the method
of obtaining food for itself. If, after a little
(a) Hobhouse. "Mind in Evolution." 1901.
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while, it showed no signs of hitting on the right
method, it was shown, and allowed to get the food.
A new trial was then begun. As the special object
of these experiments was to decide if possible
that the animal learnt by perception of results,
Mr. Hothouse emphasizes the necessity of getting
the animal's Attention, and this was no easy mat¬
ter. To secure it, he called to his aid the
method of suggestion, that is, merely pointing
at the task to be undertaken, and also that of
encouragement.
Mr. Hothouse did not insist on the importance
of the time factor in these experiments, and, as
it seems to me", with good reason", for, as we shall
see, it certainly introduces a possible fallacy
into the results.
The possibility of accident bringing about a"
successful issue was also carefully guarded against
One experiment consisted of putting' a piece of
meat on a card, to which a string was tied", and
then placing it on a shelf beyond the- reach of
the animal, with the string dangling down."
for a considerable number of trials, a cat be¬
longing' to the observer tool: no notice of the
string", did not in the least seem to appreciate
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the result that would follow from pulling it;
attention, indeed, was conspicuous by its absence.
On one occasion, however, when by accident he had
pulled the string down with his tail, he watched
its re-adjustment, and thereupon pawed it down im¬
mediately, and thereafter seldom failed. The trick
was substantially and apparently suddenly learnt
after a certain event.
The dog, who was present when the kitten was
being taught, saw Mr. Hothouse pull down the string
once, and next time took it between his teeth and
pulled it down, after several unsatisfactory at¬
tempts, on his eighth trial he did it successfully,
and never afterwards forgot. As Hothouse points out,
the first success was of quite a definite character,
apparently deliberatived in intent and entirely
distinct from the irregular pawing and scrabbling
which resorted to for several trials. This, indeed',
is strongly suggestive of learning by. perception
of results.
Another experiment, which seemed to indicate
acquirement Of discrimination, was the opening
of the door of a cgge or box, first by pulling a
lever fixed to the door and which ran out beyond
the side of the cage, secondly by a loose bolt,
which could be drawn out when, in a certain position
of the cage, the door would open. The dog had been
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in the habit of takingtthe. end of the lever in his
month and pulling it, with unsuccessful results of
course. He now treated the pull bolt in the same
manner and the door naturally fell open, but dis¬
crimination 'was slowly acquired; in the end, how¬
ever, the dog was able to learn that one sort of
projection had to be pulled out and the other pull¬
ed at right angles to the box.
The cat learnt this rapidly, and soon came to
pull out the bolt quite scientifically. In the
case of an elephant larger and stronger boxes were
used, and the animal learnt the trick after four
trials. At first she succeeded in pushing out
the bolt and so opening the box by a random effort,
but after being shown twice she had several suc¬
cesses, and after an interval of several days, pull¬
ed-out the bolt on the first trial.
A box that had to be opened by a push-back bolt
presented many difficulties to the animals; for the
post part they tried to pull it out like the other
bolt, and even a chimpanzee, though repeatedly
shown, failed to do it correctly. Eventually, the
box was left in a monkey's cage, and after two days
was found open for the first time. Later *r. Hob-
house saw the method of opening it: at the second
trial he witnessed one of the monkeys attack the
bolt, which was now placed with the catch down;
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the animal tool: hold of the handle, haised it out
of the catch Toy an up and down movement, and, con¬
tinuing this", gradually worked it back'. It was
noticed that he kept up this up and down movement
when there was no further need for it; the monkeys
learnt the trick thoroughly. It was far differ¬
ent with the dog, who never seemed to quite grasp
the difference "between working the bolt back part
of the way and the whole way. /And when, after a
few trials, he had an accidental success, it pro¬
duced no effect on his after efforts.
In another case of a box closed with an ordinary
window latch which could be lifted with the animal's
nose, and the box opened by pulling at the catch
with his paw, - this latter movement being, however,
apt to close the catch again - the dog found out
the process in one trial. He actually seemed to
show some appreciation of correlation by selecting
the catch for attack first, and then pulling the
box open.
Various other experiments were made, but those
With tumblers - the upsetting of the tumbler to
get at the contents - do not seem so conclusive,
ncff were those with stoppered jars. Indeed, Mr.
Hobhouse owns to the accidental success which seem¬
ed to be the only result in these cases.
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In the opening of the drawers of a cabinet some
interesting results were obtained, and in one or two
cases showed appreciation of what- had to be done.
But in the discrimination of a drawer in which food
was placed the failure was most marked in all cases.
This the observer attributes largely to inattention.
Mr. Hothouse considers, moreover, that the Imi¬
tation of action by the various animals rises above
a sensory-motor imitation in the narrower sense.
This requires that "the animal should be influ¬
enced by the perception at the time when it per¬
ceives it." (Of course there were some results
which weuM se m to suggest sensory-motor imitation).
The experiments in general", however", showed that
the performance was repeated when it was all over,
and the result was attained.
To prove as far as possible the direct influence
of the end to be attained upon the act, some further
discrimination experiments were instituted. ( Mind in
Evolution, p.191. et seq.)
These go to show that whatever force of habit
and whatever feebleness and uncertainty of atten¬
tion, the animals were, on the whole, aware of what
they were about, and able at need to correct their
errors by results.
Mr, Hothouse gives as a reason for imputing per¬
ceptual learning to these animals, that there was in
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in nearly all the experiments which s-ivcc ceded a
marked change of attitude at a certain point. Be¬
fore this point the efforts were mostly random
and directed at getting the food by the animal's
natural- impulsive methods. About the eighth of
ninth trial it began to be quite clear that the
animal was abandoning' these and adopting the meth¬
ods of the observer. Sometimes, indeed, the tran¬
sition was quite abrupt and striking.
There were indications also, not of learning
a certain movement only, but of doing it to bring
about a certain external change in things. That
the animal learned, not merely to respond auto¬
matically in a fixed manner, but its response was
of the nature of an endeavour to effect a certain
change, and so obtain food." "If this view is
correct" says Hothouse, "we have here, in an ele¬
mentary form', the equivalent in action of the
practical judgment or idea," While allowing' this,
however, Hobhouse carefully draws the line at at¬
tributing analysis to animals. "Hone of them
showed the least understanding of the how or why
of their actions, as distinct from the crude fact
that to do such and such a thing produced the re¬
sult, they required." As already stated, the fac¬
tor of accidental success in these experiments was
reduced to a minimum, and any such random success
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was followed by many mora failures than the apparent
learning by perception.
An interesting fact was elucidated in the course
of these experiments, namely, that the pro.esss of
learning seemed to involve great effort on the part
of the animal, and that after a comparatively fevr
trials it appeared to be exhausted. There did not
seem to be any essential difference between the
various animals in the rate of acquirement.
Mr. Hobhouse continued his experiments at the
Manchester Zoological Gardens with monkeys, more
especially with a little Khesus monkey,whose ideas
certainly seemed to show more of what Mr. Hobhouse
calls "articulateness." By an articulate idea he
means "one in which comparatively distinct elements
are held in a comparatively distinct relation."
The monkey's ceaseless experimentation soon en¬
abled it to apply one object to another, use different
objects to obtain the same result", such as a rug or
stick- to get hold of a banana just out of reach.
The animal had originally reached the food by squeez¬
ing his rug through the bars of the cage and using
it as a. means, of swishing it in. The observer then
used a walking stick and several other articles for
the same purpose, which were then in turn placed in
suitable positions within reach of the animal, and
these were promptly taken advantage of,for the same
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end; this certainly suggesting imitation of a re¬
flective order.
Instances of "original application" were com¬
mon, and success was attained with marvellous ra¬
pidity in some cases in overcoming obstacles to a
desired end. Adjustments were made, involving'
alterations of relations of one thing to another,
to meet the purpose in hand. A stick which had
been used in a vain att-mpt to reach a banana,
having been thrown away in a fit of impatience,
was afterwards pulled in by means of a second
stick which had been given to the animal.
Practical judgment, I£r. Hothouse regards as
something not identical with Association of Ideas,
but as intermediate between habituation on the one
side and general reasoning on the other.
VII, Criticism and Discussion of Results.
It has been a matter of extreme diffi¬
culty, in detailing some of the experiments men¬
tioned, to select simply such as are needed to
indicate the point aimed at by the observers in
question, and as a result the notes made are', I
fear, very imperfect. I have stated as nearly
as possible', the conclusions arrived at, in my
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judgment, by the various experimentBss.mentioned,
but greater detail would have be n desirable to
do them full justice.
Prom what", on the whole, may be termed satis¬
factory results, I think' we may conclude that the
foundation of Comparative Psychology, as an experi¬
mental science, has been established. Although
the experiments, as a whole, undoubtedly show the
tremendous obstacles to be overcome in the inves¬
tigation of comparative mental processes, yet, .in
spite of the fact that there are many obvious and
perhaps inevitable weaknesses in the methods used",
the prospect of further good work seems assured.
The experiments of Mr. Thorndike, valuable
though they are, seem to me to be unfortunate, in
the conditions under which they were carried out,
and his conclusions thereby seem vitiated. He
appears also to have weakened his case by the lack
of that essential of Inductive method - the wider
observation which accompanies experiment; and there
is an air of assertive dogmatism about his conclu¬
sions which, for a study still in its infancy,
seem singualrly unfortunate.
But the weakness most palpable in all of his
experiments - and it has been even mentioned by
Prof. Morgan, who in general agrees with him - is
the fatal unnaturalness of the conditions under
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which the experiments were carried out. To pen
cats in the limited space he allowed them, and then
expect thera to react normally, or in other words
to do themselves justice, seems to have been a
serious error of judgment. The conditions were too
precise. They were too restricted altogether.
And to add to their other miseries, the wretched
animals were put through their operations in a
state of utter hunger, upon the necessity of which
Dr. Thorndike insists. To get results, quite as
satisfactory at least, Mr. Hothouse was content to
experiment with his animals shortly before a meal.
Dr. Thorndike dwells upon the abnormal studies
of psychology of some of his fellow scientists,
but surely he could not expect a normal reaction
of any sort in circumstances of semi-starvation/
The reason apparently was to induce the animals
to make greater efforts to obtain the food, and
so the more readily escape from their prison house.
But here again a fallacy creeps in; as it is well
known that hunger, while being an irrisistable
stimulus to some animals, is reacted to almost neg¬
atively by others. Then Me. Thorndike relies
With almost absolute confidence upon the time-slope
or curve, as pointed out by Mr. Hobhouse, too ex¬
clusively. There might be many reasons for delay,
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such as failure of persistence, alteration in
mood, or accidental failure to do the necessary
actions as accurately as usual. Then the time
curve certainly in some instances appears to have
a more sudden drop than could altogether be ac¬
counted for by the tedious process of trial and
error. Indeed, some of the examples given ap¬
proximate very closely to what' Mr. Hobhouse would
call learning by perception of results, that is,
perfection was attained after a very few trials,
and then often quite suddenly.
In dealing with the important psychological
factor of imitation, while admitting that among
the primates we get acquisition by imitation, Dr.
Thorndike refused to grant that animals of any
lower order "have associations of the sort which
may be acquired from other animals by imitation."
To arrive at the conclusion, Dr. Thorndike
.seems to me to have laboured his theory a good
deal. There can be no doubt that reflective imi¬
tation is absent from all animal life be 1 ow the
primates, but man himself comparatively rarely
moves on the lines of this higher form of imita¬
tion, and instinctive imitation of his neighbours
is the commoner order of his life; so also is an¬
other form of imitation - the doing of an act from
having seen it done and noting the result, both
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of these forms of imitation are present in many
of the higher mammalia.
"r. Hothouse", while not too dogmatic about the
matter, appears to have come to a conclusion al¬
most the opposite of Mr. Thorndike's, namely, that
the influence of this perceptual form of imitation
is very considerable in animal life. Even Dr.
Stout, while agreeing in the main with Dr. Thorn-
dike's results, admits that the essential features
of imitation are present and operative at the per¬
ceptual level. Dr. Stout dwells especially on
the importance of Attention in this form of imi¬
tation, and it seems to me that this factor has
been too often relegated to a secondary position
in these experiments.
Why Dr. Thorndike excludes instinctive imitation
is difficult to understand. There is a certain
tendency to a definite act; its performance in an¬
other is noted; this becomes a focus of interest
and attention, and so the imitative, impulse comes
into operation. It .may be frequently noted that
chickens will actually stand in water without mak¬
ing any effort to drink, until the mother hen, by
doing so", sets the impulse, in operation. In all
young life this form of instinctive imitation is
constantly in evidence, and is of the utmost im¬
portance in the lives of the more social animals.
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Of course Mr. Thornd'ike is right in saying'
that the chick can do without the mother's example,
but it has been noted that there certainly is de¬
lay in the acquirement of the act of drinking water
and picking up grain 'without the maternal tuition.
Then observation has shown again and again that
animals deliberately, as it appears', teach their
young certain physical activities which 'will be of
after benefit, and that the young follow the moth¬
er's action; in the case of deer this has been fre¬
quently noted.
The animals of Mr". Thorndike's experiments
would certainly required to have been possessed of
reflective imitation to do the actions required of
them. If they had no previous knowledge of the
means of escape, granting even attention, the mere
witnessing of the performance of the necessary ac¬
tion by another animal would necessitate a certain
grasp of the nature of the problem, so to speak,
in order to follow suit; and this of course is be- .
yond the type of imitation I am contending for, and
certainly beyond that which Dr. Thorndike is pre¬
pared to concede to the animal mind.
It is a most difficult, question, but one on
which hang large issues. It is to be feared, how¬
ever, as dr. Hobhouse says, that the influence of
imitation cannot be finally established until com-
parative experiments on a large sGale have "been
conducted on this point.
'Memory.
Dr. Thorndi'ke asserts that what serves as
memory in animals is really only permanence of as¬
sociation. When, after an interval, an animal is
set to do something and does it, it is not because,
the animal feels the task the same as it vras set
some week's before and that such and such requires
to be done to free itself , but simply be,cause on
being confronted with the same situation it feels
the same impulse as it had done before. But if
Dr. Thorndi'ke grants ideas to animals at all, and
he does appear to do so rather grudgingly, the very
existence of memory of some sort is implied in them.
It is playing with words to say that permanence of
association and memory are two distinct processes.
The one is intimately and indissolubly bound up
in the other. The association may fade from mem¬
ory and become incapable of recall, but for the
reinstatement of any occurrence some kind of mem¬
ory - using the word in its wider meaning - is
essential.
There is ample evidence that animals can rein¬
state past experiences', particularly such animals
as elephents and dog's. Dr. Wesley iills mentions
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a'.case of a greyhound, who had a proclivity for
chasing cats, which, encouraged by success, be¬
came strongly marked". On one occasion, when
walking in a certain direction, the animal chased
a cai so closely that the latter sprang up a tree
for safety. A good many weeks after, Dr. Mills
was approaching the same spot with his dog, but
from an orrosite direction: when he noted every
mark of attention on the part of the animal as the
scene of the chase was r-nached, and, to his as¬
tonishment, the dog stopped, looked, and generally
behaved in a very suggestive manner opposite the
very tree the cat had sought refuge in.
Of course memory in animals varies. I have not
been recognised by my own collie after an absence
of only a few months * duration. But some of the
evidences of memory in dogs would almost seem to
imply time localization, so accurate is their ap¬
parent knowledge of events. Still, however, act¬
ing on the canon laid down by Pisof. Lloyd Morgan,
there is no need to explain these instances as a
perception of time relation on the part of the
animalt An exact parallel can be furnished in the
case of children, in whom, as is well known", locali¬
zation in time is of a most hazjy sort. So too in
human memory of a desultory order, permanence of
association is practically the whole factor in the
case,
Of whatever sort the memory of animals may
be, from what we know of their intelligence other¬
wise, it is likely to be of the immediately prac¬
tical order, with no consideration of the event,
when reinstated, in relation to other events. Hu¬
man memory, as "x. Hobhouse points out, is not an
absolute thing. Memories of past- tvents or of
things learned are in all degrees of completeness.
Dr. Thorndike argues that if the animals he
experimented with were possessed of memory they
ought, if placed in a box after some interval, to
remember exactly that by doing so and so they were
able to escape from the box. But instances might
be quoted in which precisely the same rule applies
to human memory in certain circumstances.
Mr. Hobhouse does not elaborate any theory on
animal memory, and indeed, for investigation, the
whole subject is fraught with the greatest diffi¬
culty.
In discussing the social consciousness of anim¬
als, in particular their feelinsg for one another,
Dr. Thorndike asks "Do animals when they see others
«
feeding", feel that the others are feeling pleasure?
and vice versa,' And the answer that he gives is
that they do not. In this conclusion he appears,
quite unnecessarily, to make his standard of com¬
parison an ideal one.
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ft is quite possible for an animal to know
or become aware of the fact that another is feel¬
ing pain, and to show evidences of sympathy and
to purpose relief, without realising the nature of
the suffering or being conscious that to afford
sympathy is a virtue. lU„x • i .. ,
, that is m obedience to a
universal and abstract end. This,is, of course,
impossible in animals. Dr. Thorndike's argu¬
ment would appear to be one of two extremes, either
that the animals are possessed of the abstract
idea of sympathy, which they are not, or that they
are incapable of any. But need this be so? Is
it indeed so in a great number of the actions of
our fellow men? Is the relief of distress and
suffering in humanity always in obedience to an
ideal end? I think- not. The sympathetic act
merely purposes to give immediate relief, and
though perhaps less explicit in animals, is pre¬
cisely the same in kind. It is done for a par¬
ticular instance, and not as following general
principles of action. A wise statesman or king
who, in obedience to a certain standard of moral
law, which he conceives to be right, ameliorates
the distress of a number of his people, is really
an example of one of the moral virtues which dr.
Thorndike finds lacking in animals.
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Although on similar lines, Mr. Hothouse's
experiments are much more illuminating. The an¬
imals were less cramped, and the observations made
under conditions as natural as possible; the habits
of the various animals being as little as possible
interfered with. The nature of these experiments
I have already referred to in some detail.
The phraseology Mr. Hobhouse makes use of is
of so free a character as to make his views diffi¬
cult of comparison, on certain points, with other
investigators. In his use of the word "Inference"
for instance, he goes far beyond its restricted
meaning' in human ratiocination as "the result , of the
alternate use of inductive and deductive reason,-
ing. He gives it a much wider class meaning. To
him it expresses "a certain generic unity of func¬
tion, exercised with a very different degree of
articulaten'ess", applying both to human and brute
mentality. If this can be done without the risk
of fallacy in the result, it will simplify greats
one of the problems of Soraparative Hsj'chology.
Mr. Hohhouse makes out a good case in support of
his view of the matter, and would seem to establish",
in theory at least, an ample justification.
He confronts the associationists with the fol¬
lowing instance of the behaviour of a dog; the story
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is contributed to "Animal Intelligence" by Mr.
Stone "One of them, the larger , had a
bone', and when he had left it, the smaller dog
went to take it; the larger one growled', and the
other retired into a corner. Shortly afterwards
the larger dog went out, but the other did not
appear to notice this, and at any rate', did not m
move. A few minutes later the larger dog was
heard to bark out of doors;, the little dog then,
without a moment's hesitation, went straight to
the bone and took it." This course of action
is readily explained by Prof. Lloyd Morgan, and
Would be no doubt by Prof. Wundt, both of whom
deny any possibility of animals thinking the ergo
in any form whatsoever, on the lines of pure asso¬
ciation.
But, taking Hothouse's broader view of Infer¬
ence, is it necessary', because the animal admitted¬
ly cannot reason the matter out in general terms,
that the almost mechanical aid of association has
to be sought to explain the position. Hay there,
not be, as Hothouse suggests', a middle state of me
mental development, functioning as Inference, in
circumstances such as the above, and really the
forerunner of Inference on the higher plane?
If we grant this much,then, there need he no
hesitation in allowing the presence in animal con-
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sciou3hess of ideas resulting from concrete ex¬
perience of objects, that is, re-presentation of
objects in some hind. This much, as ,vre have al¬
ready seer), the Associationists allow. It is in
the reproduction of ideas, in relation to a pres¬
ent perception, that the divergent views of the
two schools become so strikingly apparent.
In Association the present perception calls up
some past idea, this idea arising in a sort of
mechanical sequence from the one immediately in
focus. The two are held in no relation to one
another, and the sequence need not even be grasped
by the consciousness.
In the case of those who would grant a form
of Judgment to animals at this stage, both of the
factors, the recalled idea and the present per¬
ception, are present in some definite relation to
one another, and this, moreover - no matter Jkdts
indistinctly - is apprehended by consciousness.
Hobhouse calls this stage a "practical judg¬
ment" within the perceptual sphere, and quite a
different matter from a logical judgment, which,
as the apprehension of a relation expressed in
words, is outside the scope of animal mentality in
all its bearings.
Taking this view, what Hobhouse refers to as
Inference in animals^may well be termed practical
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Inference, so as to draw a wide distinction be¬
tween it and the same process on the higher plahe
which I have already referred to.
The knowledge of relations, in the form of
Judgment, which would seem to be present in some
of the higher animals, may indeed be but dimly
apprehended by the animal's own consciousness,
but, however vague it may be, it lifts animal
mentality from the plane of Association, And
there are innumerable actions on the part of
some of the higher animals, of Which such a men¬
tal attribute would undoubtedly seem "to be the
the only possible explanation, and in which it
is only by twisting and straining our interpret¬
ation of them, that we can apply to them the :
master key of the Associationists. The point
of view I have taken does not, it seems to mb,
do any violence to the canon of interpretation
of Lloyd Morgan, which X accepted at the outset
of my argument, and I see no reason,at the pres¬
ent stage of the discussion, for .withdrawing my
acceptance of it,
Mr. Hobhouse rightly lays great stress on the
factor of Attention in his experiments, and this
is also regarded as of vital importance in per¬
ceptual learning, by. Prof. Stout, who insists upon
the fact of its forming an integral part of the
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principle of Conation, already referred to. Per¬
ceptual activity, he considers, is marked through
out by this expectant and anticipatory attitude.
That Attention is an important element in
nearly all the instinctive activities of animals,
must be obvious to the most casual observer. ','ay
it is upon occasion vital even to the animal's
very existence. The value of this factor in the
performances of animals, does not seem to have
been sufficiently appreciated by Mr. Thorndike,
who seems to have been too easily satisfied that
the mere perception of an action ought to be suf¬
ficient to ensure its speedy learning by the an¬
imal, if the capacity: for learning; was upon a
higher plane than the method of trial and error.
Mr." Hobhouse, to secure attention, actually
called to his' aid suggestion and encouragement -
the latter certainly a valuable reinforcement of
the animal's own efforts. He found too, in di¬
rect contradiction to !r. Thorndike's results,
that accident need play but a small part in the
rapidity of perceptual acquisition; indeed, that
the instances in which accident- had inadvert¬
ently crept in, were noteworthy in being less
satisfactory in results than those in which it
had been entirely eliminated.
10*
Mr. Hobhouse gives as one of his reasons for
imputing perceptual learning to animals, that after
a certain number , generally not more than eight',
random efforts to obtain the desired result, there
whs a certain crucial point in nearly every case
at rhichi' a change in the attitude of the animal
took place. The old methods vrere abandoned and
those of the experimenter employed. The fact
which he adduces, that what was acquired was rare¬
ly lost after an interval, is not in itself evi¬
dence of importance in support of his theory, as
it would apply equally to the "stamping in" of
successful methods in learning by trial and error.
TUrther, there was every indication that what
an animal learnt was not mere to respond in a par¬
ticular way to a particular object", but to affect
a certain change in that object. There was of
course an entire absence of analysis as to the why
and how of these actions.
A few experiments an discrimination do not ap¬
pear to have been in any way conclusive, and this
point needs a great deal of careful investigation.
The experiments with monkeys were particularly
fortunate in being on a field most suited to their
peculiar habits. Amongst other evidences of their
general mental advance upon the other auiroals ex-
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perimented upon, may "be mentioned the imitative
faculty, which here, for the first time, seems
to reach the deflective level, and leave the mere¬
ly instinctive form of imitation behind. Intel¬
ligence in monkeys, in respect of ideas, is cer¬
tainly more clearly defined and articulate than
in any others of the mammalia. That they may
have the beginning of free floating ideas, even
I-£r. Thorndike allows', and it is the possession
of a large stock of free ideas, that he considers
marks that of human mentality from that of animals.
The evidence, in these experiments', of a cer¬
tain knowledge of relations, on the part of the
monkeys', and in one or two cases of a sort of ana¬
logical generalization', I have already referred b-.
to. But Mr. Hobhouse's results', all through the
series of experiments, are most instructive as well
as entertaining, and his inductive conclusions
most judiciously weighed'.
'VIII.' CONCLUSION.
In the earlier part of this paper, I en¬
deavoured to emphasize the Importance of the Psy¬
chological element in the life of man and animals
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as a factor in Evolution; to show that the Biolo¬
gist has too consistently ignored the part it
plays in the vride scheme of Natural Selection,
and to prove that it is the dominant Element in
the situation, morphological fitness to survive
being really a result of the fitness of the men¬
tal make-up of the animal.
This Psychical factor then, is really the
keynote of the situation, and as Natural Selec¬
tion sweeps the gamut of Zoological life, it is
by the instrumentality of this factor, that it
operates in the test for survival.
Those animals which most quickly", and to the
advantage, profit by experience, which
are able to adapt themselves most readily to a
changing environment, stand the test, those which
are not so able, are eliminated.
'This psychological factor, we saw, expressed
itself in what Dr. Stout- calls the Conative atti¬
tude, and which is to be noted, in some form or
another, in nearly the whole range of animal life;
that in proportion as Conation is sustained and
well directed, is the biological end secured.
I endeavoured to trace this tendency, or "striv¬
ing towards" right back to the stage of Keflex Ac¬
tion, venturing to suggest that its basal element
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might really he the well known irritability of
protoplasm, even so low down as the nerveless
unicellular organisms. It is on the level of
animal mentality, however, where affective states
first begin to be in evidence, that the effects
of this process are first shown, and that its con¬
sonance with biological ends becomes so apparent.
The endeavour to avoid obstruction; to attain
satisfaction, in the individual, .is, we saw", coin¬
cident with the broader aims of Evolution in racial
fitness for survival. And we noted Tow, in one
form or another, it might be applied to all tire
instinctive activities of animals, particularly
those sub-serving reproduction and play.
In the wide field of the perceptual stage of
do
animal life which has to^with immediate and prac¬
tical issues, the operation of this principle of
Psychical activity is naturall y more in objective
evidence than in any other. But, in the ascend¬
ing scale of mentality, reaching to the sublimest
level of the Ideational life of man, this same
mental factor is of paramount importance. Here
the striving is no longer, after the satisfaction,, of
an immediate need or desire; "the process of gener¬
alization brings with it generalized Conative ten¬
dencies," and the personal gratification of the
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moment 1060011163 sub-servient to the general aim of
a moral standard to be realised, whether that
standard be the gradual realization of a moral
ideal for oneself, or part of a general scheme of
human perfection. In either case the difference
between the end of perceptual Conation and Ide—
ij
national Conation, is that the former, either in
man or in animals",' is the satisfaction of an im¬
mediate and practical need, irrespective of any-
standard or ideal, the latter is the endeavour
after an end, in which the immediate impulse is
subordinated to the ideal objective. The two
processes are different only in degree. In the
mentality of animals, we have to deal merely with
the detached chords of the same great symphony,
which, in that of man, become unified into one.
majestic harmony.
The conscious endeavour of man towards a high¬
er Evolution, may not be, and indeed probably is
not, in consonance with the Evolution of Natural
Selection: the ideal of one man may be in conflict
with that of another, both of them perhaps with the
highest aims in view. Beyond this we cannot go,
since", surmise as we may, we are permitted no fur¬
ther knowledge of what is the ultimate goal of the
great scheme of Evolution.
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Keeping in biew, therefore, this unifying
principle of .Conation, vre may note that each of the
great classes of mental phenomena, referred to at
the beginning of this paper, as likewise continu¬
ous, and essentially similar, throughout the whole
range of Psychology, from the lowest possessor of
a differentiated nervous system to the complex
organisation of man.
Keflex action may thus be traced from the
lower invertebrates to man, but with a decreasing
relative importance as the scale ascends and
higher nerve 'centres are evolved, until, in man,
it plays quite an insignificant part as a psy¬
chical factor, and is Subordinated to the control
of the higher nerve centres", and the well being
of the whole body.
Instinct, we saw", must have arisen from a more
highly organized nervous system than Keflex Action,
one resulting in co-ordination of impulses, and
having under its jurisdiction a number of reflex
acts, and that in addition to this', there had be¬
gun to appear a certain emotional element. Yve
noted that, from a psychological standpoint it
could equally be assigned a place in the Unheme
of Evolution, not a territory with well defined
borders, but, nevertheless, a province in which
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it rules supreme; where, as a psychical force, it
is at its maximum; a region in which it merges in¬
to Reflex Action belovr, and one in which it is
gradually supplanted by intelligence above, This
latter is a notable enough fact, as it is a well
known thing that in man and the higher mammalia,
where the young are very largely deprived of the
nursing aid of instinct", there is longer and more
constant need of the maternal solicitude of an in¬
telligent order to take its place.
The guidance of Instinct in man. although in
view of the possibi'lit i'e s of his mental life far
less important than in animals, has more sway in
his everyday existence than is at first sight ap¬
parent, instinctive imitation of those about
him sums up nearly two thirds of the average man's
mental life.
The traditional is the most prominent form of
imitation in animal life; that is, the animal does
things because its ancestors for generations have
done so, and because it sees other animals do so.
But the influence of similar traditional behaviour,
particularly among country people, is as inexorable
as fate itself, and in no wise differs from the an¬
imal form of imitation.
Instinct, in the pure sense, we saw was incapable
of any modification, in individual cases, to suit
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changing circumstances. We also noted that there
was present in it an element of consciousness, in¬
effective, however', and inoperative for guidance
and control.
Somewhere, in the course of mental Evolution,
Intelligence on the perceptual level reaches down
into the vast domain of Instinct, quickens into
active life this dormant force, and puts it in the
place of authority. Henceforth the realm of
Instinct is one with constantly narrowing borders,
and, in so far as Intelligent control increases,
actions once entirely instinctive,, become, in a
corresponding ratio, less and less so.
It is on this level', when fully attained", -
the perceptual level - involving concrete ideas
of things; what, as showing a certain appreciation
of relations, we agreed to call "practical judgment'
ment"; and, lastly, a certain kind of practical
Inference, that we saw most of the higher mammalia
moved and had their psychical being.
It is on this level too, that the method of
learning called by Lloyd Torgan "Trial and Heror"
is to be found; but, as I pointed out, we have
reason to believe that when fully attained,it in¬
volves learning by perception of results.
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The evidence goes to prove that this tedious
process of learning by trial and error has had its
analogue in human mentality, as Shown in the amaz¬
ingly slow progress made by man in the long inter¬
val which elapsed between the stone and iron ages.
Then the life of many savage races of mankind
may be said to be lived wholly on the. perceptual
level", the practical needs and pleasures of the
moment alone being considered. The savage, in
most cases,indeed, is a creature- of impulse only;
self control and deliberation, two great marks of
the Ideational plane", being practically absent.
So too, children, before language has assumed
its descriptive element', pass through a phase which
is in all essentials similar to what is the perman¬
ent state of consciousness of one of the higher
social mammalia, such as the dog. At this stage
the spoken judgment has not come into being; lan¬
guage', to call it such, being merely the expression
of emotions by isolated ejaculations or monodyl-
ables. It is when sentences are formed,judgments
uttered, and language used for explanatory pur¬
poses that the impassable-, and, as human intellect?
tion on this plane advances, ever widening gulf
between human and brute mentality is established.
It is outside the scope of this paper to en¬
quire whether language of this sort is the cause
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of this great harrier, or is itself merely the re¬
sult of a certain stage of mental development.
One thing is certain, that it is an invaluable
and indeed necessary aid, when once formed, to
the upward progress of the mental factor in man.
What language does for human mentality, and
how it does it, it is not my purpose to try to
show here.
Putting aside then this higher form of lan¬
guage or predicated speech, with all its mighty
possibilities, what I wish to prove is that, using
language in the wider sense of any form of inter¬
communication, there exists a strict parity between
the calls and cries of animals of social habits,
which are purely instinctive in origin, and the
emotional expression of the early wants of child¬
hood. The varioiis sounds uttered by the animal
are quite as intentional and meaning as the mono¬
syllables of the child. The dog which stands
on its hind legs at the word "beg" is practically
equal in mental development - to say nothing' of
its other advantages - to that stage of 'shild life
at which, before a. desired object is given, bhe
monosyllable "Ta" must be uttered. The word has
no meaning for the child apart from what is to
follow, and the one is 110 more language, strictly
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so called, than the other. Both cases hang upon
th'e establishment of Association.
Having endeavoured to shovr the evolutional
continuity of human language with that of anim¬
als, we may note that in nearly all the psychical
activities of human life, we can similarly find
a connecting link between them and their repre¬
sentatives in animal mentality.
We have seen that imitation in animals ig of
precisely the same sort we find in human experi¬
ence, until we reach the stage where the imitation
is one of an Ideal.
The linkage between the psychical factor of
sympathy in animal life, and its equivalent in
human emotion, I also pointed out, was a very
close one. They both have their roots in the
needs of a social order of life.'
Then,the appreciation of the beautiful is',
as experienced by the average human mind, merely
a sensuous one; it is a pleasurable emotion and
nothing more. There is no analysis or comparison
involved. The choice of a mate by a bird - in so
far as choice is exercised - can be accounted for
by the superior sense-excitance caused by the
plumage or strut or song, of a particular male;
Is it going too far to say that the choice of the
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human female, on a certain level, is "based essen¬
tially on the same conditions??
Other comparisons might be made, but those X
have given appear to be sufficient evidence in sup¬
port of the view I have taken
I have endeavoured to show that Comparative
Psychology is a practical study for the Biologist,
and, that given controlled conditions of investi¬
gation, as has been pointed out, the results so
far, if inadequate", are by no means unsatisfactory.
They seem to prove that any observation must be
made, not under restricted or artificial conditions,
but, as far as possible, with the animals natural
environment. They would emphasize also the non¬
necessity for observing' the animal from birth up¬
wards - although this is by no means an easy tasl:
in the case of the higher mammalia - and noting
every detail of psychical development. Then the
use of a large number of animals of one class, so
as to establish an average mentality, and so avoid
the abnormal as far as possible", is a point to be
insisted on.
The results so far given, however, are rather
suggestive than convincing, and much work in this
field of Biology still remains to be done.
I have discussed these experiments thus briefly
in outline, mainly because they seem t© strengthen
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the arguments I have brought forward in support
of the Evolutional continuity of Mind, from its
earliest beginning's in the lowest forms of animal
life to its full efflorescence as seen in the men¬
tality of man.
And lastly, I have tried above all to urge
that this 'Psychological factor is", under Patural
Selection, of paramount importance, and that it
is indeed one of the very foundations upon which
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